Increase of Non-Immigrant Visa Application Fees Effective June 4, 2010

 Important Notice - New Nonimmigrant Application Fees: The Nonimmigrant visa application processing fees will increase on June 4, 2010 and will be tiered, as shown below. (There will no longer be one single visa application fee for all nonimmigrant categories.) See the Press Release.  Applicants will have to pay the full fee in effect on the day they apply, regardless of when they pay. (Review additional information, including a cost of service study on the www.Regulations.gov website.)

Description of Service and Fee Amount
Nonimmigrant visa application and border crossing card processing fees (per person):

• Nonimmigrant visa application processing fee (non-refundable), DS-160 or Form DS-156 for all categories below:
  
  • Non-petition-based nonimmigrant visa (except E): $140.00
  • H, L, O, P, Q and R category visa: $150.00
  • E category visa: $390.00
  • K category visa: $350.00
    
• Border crossing card fees:
  
  • Border crossing card - age 15 and over (Valid 10 years): $140.00
  • Border crossing card - under age 15; for Mexican citizens if parent or guardian has or is applying for a border crossing card (valid 10 years or until the applicant reaches age 15, whichever is sooner): $14.00

Other Fees

• L visa fraud prevention and detection fee - for visa applicant included in L blanket petition  (principal applicant only): $500.00

When the nonimmigrant visa application processing fee is not required:

• Applicants for A, G, C-3, NATO and diplomatic visas (defined in 22 CFR 41.26): No Fee
• An applicant for a J visa participating in official Department of State or USAID sponsored educational and cultural exchanges, under a G-1, G-2, G-3 or G-7 program number, as well as the applicant’s dependent spouse and children: No Fee
• Replacement of machine-readable visa when the original visa was not properly affixed or needs to be reissued through no fault of the applicant: No Fee
• Applicants exempted by international agreement as determined by Visa Services, including members and staff of an observer mission to United Nations Headquarters recognized by the UN General Assembly, and their immediate families: No Fee
• Applicants travelling to provide charitable services as determined by Visa Services: No Fee
• U.S. Government employees travelling on official business: No Fee
• A parent, sibling, spouse or child of a U.S. Government employee killed in the line of duty who is traveling to attend the employee’s funeral and/or burial; or a parent, sibling, spouse, son or daughter of a U.S. Government employee critically injured in the line of duty for visitation during emergency treatment and convalescence: No Fee

Nonimmigrant visa issuance fee, including border-crossing cards.

• See the Visa Reciprocity Tables to find out the visa issuance fee amount, if applicable: Varies (Reciprocal)

When the nonimmigrant visa issuance fee is not required:

• An official representative of a foreign government or an international or regional organization of which the U.S. is a member; members and staff of an observer mission to United Nations Headquarters recognized by the UN General Assembly; and applicants for diplomatic visas as defined under item 22(a); and their immediate families: No Fee
• An applicant transiting to and from the United Nations Headquarters: No Fee
• An applicant participating in a U.S. Government sponsored program which may include applicant’s dependent spouse and children: No Fee
• An applicant travelling to provide charitable services as determined by Visa Services: No Fee

Other - When a Visa is Not Required - Visa Waiver Program

• Citizens of Visa Waiver Program participating countries, and meeting requirements pay a small fee. Select  USCIS fees  to learn more.

Coming to the U.S. Permanently - Immigrant Services

Description of Service and Fee Amount

• Filing an immigrant visa petition (Collected for USCIS and subject to change)
  
  • Petition to classify status of alien relative for issuance of immigrant visa, select USCIS, Form I-130 for fees and form.
  • Petition to classify orphan as an immediate relative, select USCIS, Form I-600 for fees and form.
  • Petition to classify Convention Adoptee as an immediate relative, select USCIS, Form I-800 for fees and form.
  • Immigrant visa application processing fee (non-refundable, per person), Form DS-230: $355.00
• Diversity Visa Lottery surcharge for immigrant visa application (non-refundable, per person applying as a result of the lottery program): $375.00
• Immigrant visa security surcharge, for all IV and DV applicants: $45.00
• Affidavit of Support Review (only when AOS is reviewed domestically), Form I-864: $70.00

Note: Forms and fee amounts are listed for immigration petitions which are submitted to Department of State, either accepted at an Embassy or Consulate abroad, or within the U.S to the National Visa Center or Kentucky Consular Center. Other immigration related forms can only be approved by the Department of Homeland Security's United States Citizenship and Immigrants Services (USCIS).  For other fees (relating to forms starting with an “I” select  USCIS Forms and Fees  for additional information.

Special Visa Services

Description of Service and Fee Amount

• Application for Determining Returning Resident Status, Form DSP-117 : $400.00
• Transportation letter for Legal Permanent Residents of U.S.: $165.00
• Application for Waiver of 2 year foreign residency requirement (J Waiver),
  Data Sheet, Form 3035 : $215.00
• Application for Waiver of immigrant visa ineligibility (collected for USCIS), Form I-601 : $545.00
• Refugee or significant public benefit parole case processing: No Fee

( NOTE: This fee chart is based on the Code of Federal Regulations - Title 22, Part 22, Sections 22.1 through 22.7.)

 ____________________

Effective June 4, 2010, the US Department of State is increasing its non-immigrant (temporary) visa processing fees at all US embassies and consular posts and moving to a tiered schedule of fees.  The new schedule is as follows:

Nonimmigrant visa and border crossing card application processing fees (per person):

(a) Non-petition-based non-immigrant visa (except E category):  $140

These include include B1/B2 tourist and business visitor visas and all student and exchange visitor (F, M and J) visas

(b) H, L, O, P, Q and R category non-immigrant visa:  $150

- H visa - temporary workers and trainees

· L visa - intracompany transferees

· O visa - aliens with extraordinary ability

· P visa - athletes, artists and entertainers

· Q visa - international cultural exchange visitors

· R visa - religious occupations

(c) E category nonimmigrant visa:   $390

      E covers Treaty Traders and Treaty Investors.

(d) K category nonimmigrant visa:  $350

     The K category includes fiance visas and those for foreign nationals married to US citizens who are waiting for approval of a Form I-130.

(e) Border crossing card--age 15 and over (valid 10 years) :$140

(f) Border crossing card--under age 15 (for Mexican citizens if parent or guardian has or is applying for a border crossing card (valid 10 years or until the applicant reaches age 15, whichever is sooner):  $14

By law, the fees may only be set at cost. The Department of State therefore commissioned an independent study conducted from August 2007 through June 2009 to determine their actual processing costs. Average cost numbers were then rounded up to the nearest ten for easy of foreign currency conversion. The additional revenue resulting from this rounding will be used for GSS services.

The implementing legislation's list of reasons why some “petition based” visa types are more expensive (H, L, O, P, Q, and R) gives a brief insight into the processing activities conducted at the consulates for them:

• review of extensive documentation
• a more in-depth interview of the applicant
• receiving petition information from DHS,
• conducting reviews of government and commercial databases to confirm the existence of the petitioning business, and
• entering that data into the Petition Information Management Service (PIMS) database.

Visa reciprocity fees vary from country to country and still apply, so consult with your local post, consulate or embassy to find the exact visa application fees applicable in your case.

Fee changes are only in effect for non-immigrant visas applied for at consular posts (consulates and embassies).  Fee changes are under review for other consular services like US passports, immigrant visas.  Department of State, May 24, 2010 press release, Nonimmigrant Visa Application Fees to Increase June 4, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/142155.htm.

These new fees were set forth in the Federal Register: May 20, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 97),Rules and Regulations, pages 28188-28194. From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov][DOCID:fr20my10-3] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 22 CFR Part 22, Public Notice: 7018, RIN 1400-AC57. Title: Schedule of Fees for Consular Services, Department of State and Overseas Embassies and Consulates.

Nonimmigrant Visa Application Fees to Increase June 4

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On May 20, 2010, the Department of State published an interim final rule in the Federal Register to increase nonimmigrant visa application processing fees, also called the Machine-Readable Visa (MRV) fee, and Border Crossing Card (BCC) fees. The interim final rule also establishes a tiered structure with separate fees for different nonimmigrant visa categories. The new fees are scheduled to go into effect on June 4, 2010.

The Department is increasing fees to ensure sufficient resources to cover the rising cost of processing nonimmigrant visas. This increase applies both to nonimmigrant visas placed in passports and to border crossing cards issued to certain applicants in Mexico.

The new, tiered fee structure was created to cover the higher unit costs for processing certain categories of nonimmigrant visas that are more complicated and require more in-depth consideration than most other categories of nonimmigrant visas. The Department is required to recover, as far as possible, the cost of processing nonimmigrant visas through the collection of the application fees. For a number of reasons, including new security enhancements, the $131 fee set on January 1, 2008 no longer covers the current, actual cost of processing nonimmigrant visas.

Under the new schedule of fees, applicants for all visas that are not petition-based, including B1/B2 tourist and business visitor visas and all student and exchange visitor (F, M and J) visas, will pay a fee of $140.
Applicants for petition-based visas will pay an application fee of $150. These categories include:
· H visa for temporary workers and trainees
· L visa for intracompany transferees
· O visa for aliens with extraordinary ability
· P visa for athletes, artists and entertainers
· Q visa for international cultural exchange visitors
· R visa for religious occupations

The application fee for K visas for fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens will be $350. The fee for E visas for treaty-traders and treaty-investors will be $390.
Concurrent with the publication of the interim final rule, the Department will also release additional cost of service data and re-open the public comment period for an additional 60 days. At the conclusion of that period, the Department will consider public comments and publish a final rule. To view the interim final rule, please go to 75 Federal Register 28194. Comments may be submitted via www.regulations.gov.

This fee increase information may also be found on the Department of State, Travel.state.gov internet site, on the Fees for Visa Services webpage, and also on U.S. Embassy and Consulate websites abroad. Only the fees for nonimmigrant visas will change on June 4. Proposed fee changes related to U.S. passports, immigrant visas, and other consular services are still under review.

PRN: 2010/669

City of Chicago Gun Turn-in: Don't Kill A Dream. Save A Life Saturday, May 8th from 10am-4pm.

Advisory Message has been issued by the Chicago Police Department - Headquarters.

Wednesday May 5, 2010 10:00 AM CDT

City of Chicago Gun Turn-in: Don't Kill A Dream. Save A Life

The City of Chicago Gun Turn-In will be held at 22 locations throughout Chicago on Saturday, May 8th from 10am-4pm. Turn in a gun and receive a prepaid Mastercard up to $100, no questions asked! Support the event with a $10 donation by texting "DREAMS" to 2-0-2-2-2. For more information, go to www.dontkilladream.org.

For full details, go to https://local.nixle.com/alert/2066713/

A court of appeals also may set aside a decision in which the BIA has abused its discretion in applying the law to the facts-7th Cir

Kucana v. Holder, No. 07-1002
"The Supreme Court remanded this proceeding to the 7th Circuit for decision on the merits after holding that 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B) does not affect judicial review of situations in which immigration officials’ discretion is specified by regulation rather than statute. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010). Our original opinion, 533 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008), had held that No. 07-1002 a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals declining to reopen a removal proceeding may be reviewed only to determine whether the Board misunderstood a regulation, a statute, or the Constitution. 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(D).  The Justices concluded that a court of appeals also may set aside a decision in which the Board has abused its discretion in applying the law to the facts.

Agron Kucana contends that the Board abused its discretion in two ways: by not discussing an affidavit submitted in support of the motion to reopen, and by disregarding his eligibility for adjustment of status. Our 2008 opinion understood the second of these arguments to be a legal one and rejected it as forfeited: Kucana did not make such an argument to the Board, which is not required to consider possibilities never presented for decision. 533 F.3d at 538–39. It is unnecessary for us to revisit that subject. The only remaining question concerns the Board’s decision not to mention the affidavit."

On remand from the Supreme Court for a ruling on the merits after its holding that 8 U.S.C. section 1252(a)(2)(B) does not affect judicial review of situations in which immigration officials' discretion is specified by regulation rather than statute, and that a court of appeals also may set aside a decision in which the Board has abused its discretion in applying the law to the facts, Albanian citizen's petition for review of the BIA's refusal to reopen removal proceedings is denied as the Board's conclusion that the evidence did not show a material adverse change in country conditions between 2002 and 2006 did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Law professor Amanda Leiter (Catholic) argued as amicus against judicial review because Solicitor General Elena Kagen agreed with the petitioner on the availability of judicial review of the denial of a motion to reopen.

Having overslept, Kucana, a citizen of Albania, missed a hearing on his asylum and withholding of removal claims. He sought a motion to reopen the proceedings, which the immigration court and BIA denied. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction, a holding in conflict with six other circuits. The Suoereme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court. Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment. The Court ruled that the applicable provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 by its terms only barred the review of the discretionary judgments by the Attorney General, not the discretionary determinations delegated by the Attorney General to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Thus, the Court held that courts of appeals have the authority to review denials of motions to reopen by the BIA.

The Court expressed the view that a motion to reopen is an "'important safeguard'" (citing Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008). This is a very different approach to motions to reopen than seen in years past, with the Court (INS v. Wang (1981) and INS v. Abudu (1988)) emphasizing the need for the courts to defer to the judgment of the BIA on motions to reopen. In the Court's estimation, the language of the statute, the history of the statute and regulations, and the presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action, all militated in favor of judicial review of the denial of a motion to reopen.

Rescission of lawful permanent resident status-7th Cir. 2010 Estrada v. Holder, No. 08-1226

Petition for review of the BIA's affirmance of an IJ's refusal to examine a Mexican citizen's challenge to the validity of a 1996 rescission of his lawful-permanent-resident status by the INS is granted and the rescission order vacated and remanded as petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the notice he received before the agency rescinded his permanent resident status was reviewable in his removal proceedings. However, district court's decision to dismiss petitioner's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is affirmed as the complaint filed in district court is the equivalent to a challenge to an order of removal within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. section 1252(a)(5), which permits judicial review only via a petition for review in the court of appeals.

Domingo Cueto Estrada, a native of Mexico, entered the United States illegally in 1987. Thanks to the Special  Agriculture Worker (“SAW”) program, 8 U.S.C. § 1160,  Cueto Estrada was granted lawful-permanent-resident  status in 1990. But the government soon suspected that  Cueto Estrada received his permanent-resident status by  fraudulent means. Domingo Luna, who helped Cueto  Estrada prepare his SAW application, was convicted of  filing false statements on other SAW applications in  violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1160(b)(7)(A)(ii). The government  believed Cueto Estrada likewise purchased fraudulent  employment documents from Luna to support his  SAW application.

In 1995 immigration authorities initiated proceedings  that led to the rescission of Cueto Estrada’s status as  a legal permanent resident. The INS sent Cueto Estrada  notice of its intent to rescind his permanent-resident  status; the notice was sent via certified mail to Cueto Estrada’s last-known address. Had Cueto Estrada responded to the notice, he would have been entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to contest the rescission.  See 8 C.F.R. § 246.3. But the immigration agency never heard from Cueto Estrada, and in 1996 the INS rescinded  his peramanent resident status without a hearing as permitted by 8 C.F.R. § 246.2.

Cueto Estrada claims he never received the 1995 notice  and says he first learned that he had lost his permanent- resident status in 2005 when the Department of Homeland  Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Although he applied for cancellation of removal  under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), his claim hinged on his ability  to show that he was a lawful permanent resident; if he  is not a lawful permanent resident, Cueto Estrada  admits he would be statutorily ineligible for cancellation  of removal under § 1229b(b). To make the required  showing, Cueto Estrada argued that the 1996 rescission  of his permanent-resident status was invalid because  he did not receive proper notice of the INS’s intent to  rescind. Had he been given proper notice, Cueto Estrada. Cueto Estrada was convicted of possessing heroin in 1999, a  violation of Illinois law. For purposes of this case, the Attorney  General alleges that Cueto Estrada could be removed via   proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a because he had committed  a state-law controlled-substance offense and because Cueto  Estrada arrived in the United States illegally. See 8 U.S.C.  § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), (a)(6)(A)(i). Cueto Estrada concedes he  can be removed on account of his drug conviction under  § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

The IJ rejected this argument by relying on Rodriguez- Esteban, in which the BIA concluded that immigration  courts may not review a decision to rescind permanent-resident status made by the INS. The IJ thought that  Rodriguez-Esteban prohibited him from either revisiting  the merits of the INS’s decision to rescind Cueto  Estrada’s status or considering whether the rescission  order was invalid because the INS did not comply with its regulatory obligation to provide adequate notice of  the agency’s intent to institute rescission proceedings. Accordingly, since Cueto Estrada was no longer a lawful permanent resident, he was statutorily ineligible for  cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). The IJ  ordered Cueto Estrada removed. The BIA adopted and  affirmed the IJ’s decision in 2008, and Cueto Estrada  filed a petition for review in this court.

In early 2007, while these removal proceedings were  underway, Cueto Estrada asked the U.S. Citizenship and  Immigration Service (“USCIS”) to reconsider its 1996  decision to rescind his permanent-resident status,  arguing that the rescission was improper because he  never received notice of the INS’s intent to rescind.

The USCIS denied his request in April 2007, treating his  motion as untimely since it had been filed  years after  the 1996 decision was made, well outside the 30-day  period for filing reconsideration requests under 8 C.F.R.  § 103.5(a)(1)(i). At the time of the USCIS’s decision, the  IJ had not yet ordered Cueto Estrada removed, and  the USCIS observed that any relief Cueto Estrada  sought “may be raised with the [IJ] during your removal  proceeding.” Cueto Estrada filed a petition for review  of the USCIS decision with this court in 2007, but we dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Cueto  Estrada challenged the USCIS order by filing a complaint  with the district court. Although he claimed that  the USCIS’s refusal to revisit its 1996 rescission order  violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and his due-process rights, the district court treated Cueto  Estrada’s complaint as a challenge to a removal order and dismissed his case for lack of jurisdiction. Cueto Estrada appealed this dismissal, and we consolidated his appeal with his petition for review.

We acknowledge that on remand Cueto Estrada  could win his battle against the 1996 rescission order but lose his campaign to stay in this country. Cueto  Estrada remains statutorily ineligible for cancellation of  removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) unless he can restore  his permanent-resident status. If Cueto Estrada convinces  the immigration agency that the rescission order  is invalid, that  only means he becomes statutorily  eligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(a); it does not entitle him to relief from removal. A decision  to cancel removal—regardless of whether the alien is a lawful permanent resident—is a discretionary one,  Bakarian v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 775, 785 (7th Cir. 2008), and  the BIA might decide against granting Cueto Estrada  the relief he seeks. In an effort to persuade us that  remand would be futile, the Attorney General has identified  several reasons why the agency would not likely  cancel removal in this case. But the decision to grant  Cueto Estrada relief lies with immigration officials  who are charged with balancing the factors identified  in Matter of Marin, 16 INA Dec. 581, 584-87 (BIA 1978),  and we will not assume that they would decline to cancel removal.

Estrada v. Holder (Sykes)
Oral Argument | Full Text

Asylum, China's one-child policy and membership in social group-7th Cir. 2010 Chen v. Holder, No. 08-2836

A Chinese national and citizen's petition for review of the BIA's affirmance of Immigration Judge's denial of his application for asylum and related relief, claiming that he has been or will be persecuted because of his family's resistance to China's one-child policy and his membership in social groups that include his family and the hei haizi (i.e., someone born in violation of China's one-child policy), is granted and the matter remanded where: 1) the agency's analysis of petitioner's asylum claim was incomplete as the BIA failed to address his claim of past persecution based on imputed political opinion as, although his mother's forcible sterilization does not automatically entitle him to a finding of past persecution, it may in combination with other evidence show that his family's resistance to China's population-control policy has been imputed to him; and 2) the BIA failed to consider the cumulative significance of the hardships visited upon petitioner and his family, and the future hardships he would face if returned, when evaluating his fear of future persecution.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Shi Chen is a native of China who as the fifth child in his family was born in severe violation of China's one-child policy. As a penalty for his unlawful birth, his mother was forcibly sterilized, and his parents were required to pay a large fine that equaled the family's annual income. Chen's aunt had earlier been forced to abort an illegal pregnancy and she, too, was thereafter involuntarily sterilized.

Children born illegally in China--known as the hei haizi--may not be listed on their family registry, the hukou, and are therefore denied many of the rights of full citizenship. Among these are the right to state-provided elementary schooling, higher education, and health care; the right to be included in the family's land and food allocation; and the right to move freely about the country. The hei haizi are also excluded from many jobs, may not acquire property, and in some cases are denied the right to marry and have children. Chen's parents paid large fines in order to list Chen on the back of their hukou; though this did not legalize him, it did allow him to attend school as long as his parents continued to pay the ongoing fines. Their ability to do so ran out before he reached high school.

When he was 17 years old, Chen left China for the United States and upon arrival was immediately detained by immigration officials. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he has been or will be persecuted because of his family's resistance to China's one-child policy and his membership in social groups that include his family and the hei haizi. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (persecution on account of political opinion includes persecution for resistance to a coercive population-control program). An Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed. Chen petitioned this court for review.

We grant the petition and remand to the immigration agency for further proceedings. The agency's analysis of Chen's asylum claim was incomplete. The BIA failed to address Chen's claim of past persecution based on imputed political opinion--that is, the persecution that his mother and other family members suffered for their resistance to China's coercive population-control policy. His mother's forcible sterilization does not automatically entitle Chen to a finding of past persecution, but it may in combination with other evidence show that his family's resistance to China's population-control policy has been imputed to him. The BIA also failed to consider the cumulative significance of the hardships visited upon Chen and his family--and the future hardships he would face if returned--when evaluating Chen's fear of future persecution.

I. Background

Chinese law significantly restricts the freedom of its citizens to bear children. No family is permitted to have more than two children, and Chinese law limits most families to one child. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS &LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CHINA: PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS 21 (Oct. 2005) ("2005 COUNTRY REPORT"). Married couples are required  to use birth control and must obtain official permission--in the form of a "birth permit"--before having a second child; some provinces require a birth permit for a first child as well. Id. at 22. Violations carry heavy fines--"social maintenance and compensation" fees--as well as other consequences for the parents, including job loss or demotion, imprisonment in a "population school," and forcible abortion or sterilization. Id. at 22-23.

Lawfully born Chinese children are listed on the family hukou, a registration document that entitles family members to the rights of full citizenship. Children born unlawfully are known as the hei haizi (meaning "black children") and are ineligible for registration on the hukou. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PERSPECTIVE SERIES: CHINESE STATE BIRTH PLANNING IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND 38 (Sept. 2001). These "unplanned persons" are denied the right to state-provided elementary schooling, higher education, health care, and other governmental services and benefits. Id. As adults they are excluded from many jobs, may not purchase property, and may be denied the right to marry and have children. Id.; see also 2005 COUNTRY REPORT, at 23 (describing China's unregistered "floating" population).

Shi Chen was born in violation of China's one-child policy. He is a native of a small village in the Fujian province and is the youngest of five children and the only boy. Chen's parents spent many years evading the population-control authorities in their village, and his family paid dearly for his birth. Soon after Chen was born, his mother--who lived in hiding while pregnant to avoid a forced abortion--was involuntarily sterilized. His mother's sister had earlier been forced to abort an illegal pregnancy in her ninth month; afterward she was involuntarily sterilized. Chen's parents were required to pay a large fine equivalent to the family's annual income as a penalty for his unlawful birth. They had to give away one of his sisters shortly after she was born because they could not afford to keep her. During an earlier pregnancy, Chen's mother fell off a ladder while fleeing from population-control authorities; she broke both her ankles, and the baby was stillborn.

Because Chen was born illegally, he could not be registered on the hukou and his family was denied the food and land allocation provided for lawfully born children. Payment of additional, ongoing fines allowed his family to list Chen's name on the back of their hukou. This permitted him to attend school as long as his parents continued to pay; they were able to do so through the equivalent of middle-school but not beyond. (Chen's father is a subsistence farmer and works odd jobs for extra income to support the family.) As a member of the hei haizi, Chen asserts that he is denied access to health care and other governmental services; is excluded from higher education and many types of employment; and will be denied the right to marry and have children, the right to own property, and the right to freely travel within and outside of China.

In 2004, when he was 17, Chen obtained false travel documents and fled China for the United States. Upon arrival in this country, he was detained by immigration officials and placed in removal proceedings. Chen conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection against removal under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). Citing his family's history of persecution for violating China's one-child policy, he claimed he would be targeted for forced sterilization and other persecution if returned to China.

The IJ who heard Chen's case credited his testimony (it was corroborated by several affidavits--most notably, one from his father) but rejected his claims for relief, concluding that Chen had not established past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. In the IJ's view, the economic plight his family suffered on account of his birth was not severe enough to be considered past persecution, especially since Chen had never been detained by Chinese authorities and had been permitted to attend school. The IJ also rejected Chen's argument that he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his status as a member of the hei haizi.

The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision but conducted its own analysis. Acknowledging that economic harm can constitute persecution in appropriate circumstances, the BIA held that the economic hardship Chen's family suffered was not significant enough to constitute persecution. The BIA also rejected Chen's argument that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution; the agency based this conclusion on the fact that Chen had found employment after his family could no longer afford the fines necessary to permit him to attend school and had also obtained a Chinese passport before leaving the country. Finally, the BIA rejected Chen's claim that he would be targeted for sterilization based on his family's resistance to China's population-control policy. The BIA noted that it had never before held that "the political opinion of a parent who has been forcibly sterilized can be imputed to that parent's child," and "current caselaw [in the Seventh Circuit] does not allow the respondent's mother's political opinion to be imputed to him." Chen petitioned this court for review.

II. Discussion

Where, as here, the BIA conducts its own analysis rather than supplementing or adopting the decision of the IJ, we review the BIA's decision. Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2007). The agency's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See Mekhtiev v. Holder, 559 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2009). We will uphold the agency's factual findings so long as they are "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole." Chatta v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). Under this deferential standard of review, reversal is warranted only if "the evidence compels a different result"; we will not overturn the agency's findings simply because we might have decided the case differently. Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2004). On the other hand, remand may be warranted when the agency overlooks key aspects of an asylum-seeker's claim and might reach a different conclusion after a more complete evaluation of the record. See Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2007); Chitay-Pirir v. INS, 169 F.3d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir. 1999).

The Attorney General has discretion to grant an alien asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act if the alien qualifies as a "refugee." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A refugee is a person who is unwilling or unable to return to his native country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). A showing of past persecution will trigger a rebuttable presumption that the alien has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Even if an alien cannot show he has been subject to past persecution, he may nevertheless be eligible for asylum if he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id. § 208.13(b)(2). This requires the alien to show that his fear of persecution is both "subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable." Bolante v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 2008). To prevail under this standard, the alien must present "specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that he . . . will be singled out for persecution." Sayaxing v. INS, 179 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).

Chen's claims for relief are premised on his assertion that he has been or will be persecuted on account of political opinion and membership in a particular social group. Regarding the former ground, Chen's argument is based on § 1101(a)(42)(B), which provides that persons who have been subjected to certain coercive population-control measures or otherwise have been or will be subjected to persecution for resistance to a coercive population-control program are deemed to have been persecuted on account of their political opinion. More specifically:

For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B). This subsection of the statute creates four classes of refugees: (1) those who have been forced to have an abortion or who have been involuntarily sterilized; (2) those who have been persecuted for failing or refusing a coerced abortion or sterilization or for other resistance to a coercive population-control program; (3) those who have a well-founded fear that they will be forced to have an abortion or be sterilized; and (4) those who have a well-founded fear that they will be persecuted for failing or refusing such procedures or for resisting a coercive population-control program. See Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2004).

The Attorney General has concluded that only those who have themselves been forced to have an abortion or have been involuntarily sterilized fall into the first class of refugees. Matter of J-S-, 24 I. &N. Dec. 520, 527 (AG 2008); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (aliens who fall into this category are automatically entitled to the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution). Overruling BIA precedent, Matter of J-S- held that an asylum-seeker whose spouse has suffered a forced abortion or sterilization is not per se eligible for asylum. Rather, the applicant must show that he or she personally suffered or will suffer persecution for resisting a coercive population-control program. Matter of J-S-, 24 I.&N. Dec. at 542; accord Lin-Zheng v. Attorney General, 557 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2009); Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 314 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc).

Accordingly, under Matter of J-S-, evidence that the applicant's spouse was forced to abort a pregnancy or undergo involuntary sterilization is relevant to the applicant's claim but does not alone establish eligibility; the applicant must also present evidence of his or her own past persecution or reasonable fear of future persecution. See Matter of J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 534-35 ("Some  spouses may not have 'resisted,' and in fact may have affirmatively supported, the forced abortion or sterilization procedure that was performed on the spouse who remains in China. . . . [A]pplicants must present proof, of which their spouse's treatment may be a part, of persecution for refusing to undergo forced abortion or sterilization procedures or for engaging in 'other resistance' to a coercive population control program, or of persecution on account of another ground for asylum enumerated in the Act."). The Attorney General's interpretation of § 1101(a)(42)(B) is entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984), and the rationale of Matter of J-S- applies with equal force to the claim of an asylum-seeker like Chen whose parent has been forced to have an abortion or undergo sterilization. See Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 417 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("[C]hildren are not per se as eligible for relief . . . as those directly victimized themselves."); Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); Wang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 134, 142-43 (3d Cir. 2005) (same).

So Chen does not fall into the first category of refugees created by § 1101(a)(42)(B). Under the rationale of Matter of J-S-, Chen is not automatically eligible for asylum because his mother was sterilized against her will. Nor does Chen fall into the second class of refugees; he has not "failed or refused" to be sterilized and has not otherwise "resisted" China's one-child policy. He may, however, fall within the third and fourth classes of refugees under § 1101(a)(42)(B)--those who have a well-founded fear of involuntary sterilization (forced abortion obviously is not at issue here), or those who fear persecution for refusing sterilization or otherwise resisting a coercive population-control program. Chen has consistently argued that he fears he will be involuntarily sterilized and otherwise persecuted because of his and his family's violation of China's one-child policy.

Chen's claim is thus based partly on a theory of imputed political opinion. He contends that Chinese population-control authorities either have imputed or will impute his parent's resistance to China's one-child policy to him. The BIA flatly rejected this argument based on a perceived lack of circuit precedent to support it. To the contrary, however, it is well established in this circuit that an alien may base a persecution claim on imputed political opinion. Under this theory the alien is asserting that his persecutors have mistreated or will mistreat him because they attribute someone else's--often a family member's--political beliefs to him. See Mema v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[A]sylum is available to persons who have been persecuted based on imputed political opinion, including situations where a persecutor attributes the political opinion of one or more family members to the asylum applicant." (emphasis removed)); Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2005); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 509-10 (7th Cir. 1998). To prevail on this sort of claim, the alien must show that (1) his persecutors attributed the political opinion of another to him, and (2) the attributed opinion motivated or will motivate the persecution. Sankoh v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 456, 471 (7th Cir. 2008).

Chen argues that population-control authorities have attributed or will attribute his parent's flagrant violation of China's population-control program to him and that he is therefore likely to be targeted for involuntary sterilization if returned to China. The Second and Ninth Circuits have recognized that an asylum claim alleging persecution for resistance to a coercive population-control program under § 1101(a)(42)(B) may be partially based on imputed political opinion--more specifically, such a claim may rely in part on a parent's persecution for resisting a coercive population-control program. See Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2007); Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1246-47; Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004). This is a specific application of the more general imputed political-opinion theory--already established in this circuit--and we therefore follow the lead of these circuits in recognizing it here.

Our decision in Chen v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 670, 674-75 (7th Cir. 2006), is not to the contrary. The alien in Chen had two children in the United States, intended to have more children in China, and feared she would be involuntarily sterilized. To support her claim, the alien submitted State Department reports and evidence that her parents had been involuntarily sterilized. We noted that this evidence did not compel the conclusion that the alien would be sterilized upon her return to China because the alien's parents had been "sterilized many years ago under circumstances bearing no relation to her present circumstances." Id. at 675.

Here, in contrast, Chen has submitted specific and detailed evidence tending to show that he and his family have been uniquely targeted by the population-control committee in their village based on their persistent resistance to China's one-child policy. He submitted evidence that his family spent many years hiding from population-control authorities in their village; his mother lost a child in utero when she fell trying to escape population-control authorities; his mother was forcibly sterilized after his birth; his aunt suffered a forcible abortion and was thereafter involuntarily sterilized; his parents had to give away one of his sisters because they could not afford her; and his family was subjected to significant economic hardship as a result of their extreme resistance to China's one-child policy.

As we have noted, the BIA summarily rejected the imputed political-opinion basis of Chen's claim without analysis, having concluded that "current caselaw" in this circuit did not support it. But the concept of persecution based on imputed political opinion has long been recognized in this circuit, and Chen's claim falls comfortably within this theory of relief. Accordingly, remand is in order to give the BIA "the first opportunity to pass judgment on . . . [a] claim it previously ignored." Hamdan v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 986, 992-93 (7th Cir. 2008). The agency should consider "the totality of the circumstances . . . to determine whether harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors may constitute past persecution of the applicant, even if government authorities neither directly harmed the applicant nor harmed the family member in order to target the applicant." Jiang, 500 F.3d at 141.

There is another reason to return this case to the agency: Chen also presented evidence that as a member of the hei haizi--a child ineligible for registration on the hukou because he was born in violation of China's population-control program--he has been and will continue to be deprived of many fundamental rights and governmental benefits. This evidence, he argued, both buttressed his claim of persecution based on political opinion and established a separate ground for relief based on persecution because of his membership in a particular social group. The BIA's treatment of this claim, too, was incomplete. The agency did not evaluate the cumulative significance of these hardships when evaluating Chen's claim of past persecution (on political-opinion grounds or based on his membership in a particular social group); nor did the agency properly account for this evidence in evaluating the reasonableness of his fear of future persecution.

Many of the hardships Chen suffered as a hei haizi and will continue to face if returned to China are economic in nature. Because of his unlawful birth, Chen and his family were subjected to severe financial deprivation; this took the form of enormous fines--at his birth and thereafter to allow him to attend school--as well as the denial of the land and food allotment permitted to lawfully born children. His father testified via affidavit that as a result of these fines, the family--already very poor--often went hungry. Chen submitted evidence that as an unregistered person, he is denied access to government-provided higher education, health care (except that which can obtained at high cost on the black market), and many forms of employment.

It is well established that persecution can take the form of economic deprivation as well as physical mistreatment, see, e.g., Yun Jian Zhang v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007); Tarraf v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 525, 535 (7th Cir. 2007); a claim of persecution based on economic deprivation generally requires a showing of a " 'deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or other essentials of life,' " Xiu Ling Chen v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 171 (BIA 2007) (emphasis removed in Xiu Ling Chen)). This does not mean, however, that the alien must establish a "total deprivation of livelihood on account of his protected status." Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Considered in the aggregate, the economic hardships imposed as a penalty for violation of China's population-control policy may, in appropriate cases, constitute persecution. The Third Circuit has concluded as much in a case involving a Chinese father of four who sought asylum based on the economic deprivations his family suffered because of their violation of China's one-child policy:

[W]hile Li's family did not reach near-starvation levels, we can fairly say that the economic restrictions allegedly faced by the Li family were "severe." In the aggregate, a fine of more than a year and a half's salary; blacklisting from any government employment and from most other forms of legitimate employment; the loss of health benefits, school tuition, and food rations; and the confiscation of household furniture and appliances from a relatively poor family constitute deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage which could threaten his family's freedom if not their lives. Moreover, the economic harm in Li's case was deliberately imposed as a form of punishment because of his violation of China's population control policy, rather than being the result of "natural" economic downturns or generally harsh conditions shared by others in China. We hold that, when viewed in the aggregate, Li's allegations amount to economic persecution.

Li v. Attorney General, 400 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2005).

Beyond economic deprivations, Chen has presented evidence that as a hei haizi he is deprived of other fundamental rights as well: He cannot acquire property or move freely about the country, and may be denied the right to marry and have children. We have often emphasized the importance of evaluating the "cumulative significance" of multiple claimed hardships in evaluating asylum claims. See Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 571 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, however, the BIA dismissed Chen's claim of persecution based on his status as a hei haizi by reference to a solitary piece of evidence--the fact that Chen was able to obtain a passport and therefore "was given the right to travel by the Chinese government." This is woefully inadequate. The BIA ignored much of Chen's evidence and never addressed his argument about the combined effect of the economic and noneconomic deprivations he and his family have suffered and that he contends he will continue to suffer if returned to China. See Joshi v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 732, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2004) ("A decision that resolves a critical factual question without mention of the principal evidence cannot be considered adequately reasoned.").

We do not now conclude that the record compels a conclusion that Chen suffered past persecution or has an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution based on imputed political opinion or membership in his family or the hei haizi, or both. Because the BIA's analysis flowed from a misapprehension of the state of this circuit's caselaw and was otherwise incomplete, these are matters for the BIA to address on remand, in light of the principles we have explained here and based on the totality of the evidence.

Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the decision of the BIA, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Chen v. Holder (Sykes)
Oral Argument | Full Text