Friday, September 30, 2011

Jonaitiene v. Holder-7th Circuit

In 2000 husband and wife, citizens of Lithuania, entered the U.S. with illegally-obtained visas. They have two children born in Lithuania and a third born in the U.S. When the visa fraud was discovered, they cooperated and were sentenced to one year of probation. The government charged them with removability for being inadmissible at the time of entry and for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A), 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II), and 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Petitioners applied for asylum and withholding of removal. The Immigration Judge denied the request for asylum; the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The affidavits established, at best, that the government of Lithuania is unstable and does little to protect its citizens. Fear of retribution from co-defendants for an alien's cooperation with the U.S. government, in exchange for a reduced sentence, is not a well-founded fear based on a protected ground.

For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 10-1100 & 10-1101
RASA JONAITIENE AND MARIUS BUBENAS,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of the Orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Nos. A077-651-529, A077-495-492
ARGUED OCTOBER 28, 2010—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 26, 2011 
Before MANION, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Rasa Jonaitiene and Marius Bubenas were citizens of Lithuania in 2000, when each gained entry into the United States through the use of illegally-obtained visas. They do not dispute that Bubenas, along with Jonaitiene’s brother Daruas Daugela, arranged to obtain a United States visa from a man named Darius Reika. Bubenas used that visa to come to the United States in March 2000, and Jonaitiene followed in July of that year. Bubenas and Jonaitiene have three children together, two born in Lithuania and the third born in the United States.
Eventually, the United States government became aware of the visa fraud scheme that included bribery of a United States Foreign Officer in Lithuania to obtain the visas, and the petitioners were both arrested and charged in three counts of a nineteen-count indictment in federal court. The petitioners agreed to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of other members of the scheme. Based on that cooperation, the government dismissed two counts of the superceding indictment and filed a substantial assistance motion. Petitioners pled guilty to the remaining count and were sentenced to one year of probation. On June 17, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against petitioners, charging them with removability for being inadmissible at the time of entry and for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A), 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II), and 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The petitioners conceded their removability, but sought relief from removal through applications for asylum and withholding of removal.
Petitioners contend that they are fearful of returning to Lithuania because of threats from Darius Reika, who resides there, and because the Lithuanian government is either unwilling or unable to protect them. In their written statements as well as their testimony at the hearing, the petitioners detailed threatening phone calls made to them by Reika after their arrest.
Jonaitiene’s brother, who had arranged for the payments to Reika for the visas and who also resides in the United States, received threats from Reika as well, and ultimately committed suicide. The petitioners also introduced evidence that the Lithuanian newspapers had published articles detailing their cooperation in the government investigation into the visa fraud scheme. They asserted that because of that cooperation, they would be in danger from Reika if returned to Lithuania. They also asserted that they would be considered traitors in their country, but could not explain upon questioning why a cooperating witness in a criminal case would be considered a traitor, nor how such cooperation in identifying fraud in the American embassy would be considered a traitorous act against Lithuania.
In addition to the threats from Reika, the petitioners provided evidence that after Jonaitiene’s threatening calls, the door to Jonaitiene’s mother’s apartment was set on fire in Lithuania. The petitioner’s children were staying with Jonaitiene’s mother at that time. In response to that fire, the United States government brought the children and Jonaitiene’s mother to the United States temporarily under Significant Public Benefit Parole. The fire department investigated the blaze, but according to the petitioners the police did not do so.
The only evidence presented relating to the Lithuanian government was their inadequate response with respect to Reika and the fire. When the visa fraud scheme was first revealed, Reika was detained by the Lithuanian police for two weeks but then released. No charges were filed against Reika. Moreover, as was noted, the petitioners argue that the police failed to investigate the fire at the apartment.
The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the request for asylum, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed in a separate opinion. The IJ held that the harm that the petitioners feared in Lithuania was not on account of a protected ground, and that no competent evidence was presented to support the contention that the government was complicit in the visa fraud or would be supportive of the persons such as Reika that the petitioners feared. The BIA echoed those holdings in its separate opinion. It agreed that the petitioners had failed to provide evidence of government complicity, and noted that a personal dispute cannot support a claim of asylum. Relying on our decision in Jun Ying Wang v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006), the BIA noted that the fear of retribution from co-defendants for an alien’s cooperation with the United States government, in exchange for a reduced sentence, is not a well-founded fear based on a protected ground. Accordingly, the BIA held that the petitioners failed to establish a nexus between the feared persecution and a protected ground.
Where the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and supplements that decision with its own reasoning, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented. Kaharudin v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2007). Under the substantial evidence test, we affirm the denial of asylum and of withholding of removal by the IJ and BIA if it is “‘supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’ ” Wang, 445 F.3d at 997, quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); Gjerazi v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 800, 807 (7th Cir. 2006).
In order to obtain asylum, the petitioners must establish that they are refugees, which is defined as persons unable or unwilling to return to their country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 USC § 1101(a)(42)(A); Wang, 445 F.3d at 997; Hernandez-Baena v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 720, 722-23 (7th Cir. 2005). The first part of that definition may be problematic for the petitioners but we need not tarry long there because the latter part is insurmountable.
The first obstacle that petitioners face is that persecution under that definition does not encompass purely private actions. In order to demonstrate persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution, the petitioners must demonstrate that the threatening conduct is by the government, or that it is by private persons whom the government is unwilling or unable to control. Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2005); Galina v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000). The petitioners have presented very little evidence of such government complicity or inability. We have only allegations that Reika was not prosecuted by the Lithuanian government for the visa fraud scheme, and that the police did not investigate the fire at the apartment. Missing is any indicator as to why those decisions were made, and whether they constituted a deviation from standard operating procedures. We do not know, for instance, whether the investigation of fires is normally left to the fire department, which did investigate the incident, nor do we know whether the Lithuanian government was presented with sufficient evidence to prosecute Reika but chose not to do so. Nevertheless, even if the allegations here were sufficient to demonstrate persecution, petitioners do not even allege that it is on account of one of the protected grounds.
The petitioners assert in a conclusory manner that they were members of a particular social group, but provide no identification of that alleged group other than to identify themselves as informants whose cooperation was induced by the government through promises of protection. Rather than explain how that constitutes a “social group” under the refugee definition, they argue that the United States government created a dangerous condition by inducing their cooperation, and therefore had an affirmative duty to protect them from that danger.
We have rejected a similar argument in Wang v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2006). Jun Ying Wang, a native of China, was present in the United States unlawfully having overstayed her visitor’s visa, when she was arrested for her part in a scheme to obtain Social Security cards using fraudulent documents. Id. at 994. Wang cooperated with the government’s investigation and in turn received a more lenient sentence. Id. She applied for asylum based on her fear that she would be attacked by her codefendants, who were in China and sought retribution for her cooperation against them. Id. We rejected the asylum claim, holding that Wang had failed to demonstrate that the persecution she feared was on account of one of the five statutorily-protected grounds. Wang did not explain how her claim fit within one of the protected grounds, choosing instead to argue that the term “refugee” should not be interpreted too rigidly and that she should be eligible because her persecution stemmed from her assistance to the United States government. Id. at 997. The petitioners mirror those arguments in their briefs to this court. We rejected that argument in Wang, holding that we are bound by the language of the statute, and that fear of persecution as a result of a personal dispute rather than on account of a person’s membership in a protected group fails to satisfy the definition of refugee. Id. at 998; Marquez v. I.N.S., 105 F.3d 374, 380 (7th Cir. 1997).
A “social group” under the Act is one ‘whose members share “common characteristics that members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because such characteristics are fundamental to their individual identities.’” Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 428 (7th Cir. 2009), quoting In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (BIA 1996); see also Poroj-Mejia v. Holder, 397 Fed.Appx. 234, 237, 2010 WL 4102295, 2 (7th Cir. 2010). The social group, however, cannot be defined merely by the fact of persecution. See Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1198 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The risk of persecution alone does not create a particular social group within the meaning of the INA . . .”) Nor may a social group be defined solely by the shared characteristic of facing dangers in retaliation for actions they took against alleged persecutors. Wang v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 2006); Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 2006); Poroj-Mejia, 397 Fed.Appx. at 237, 2010 WL 4102295 at 2. The petitioners have not attempted to distinguish their claim from those precedents, and in fact have made no argument as to how they constitute a protected group under the Act. They rely instead on their generalized assertion that the government must grant asylum because it placed them in danger by inducing their cooperation in the criminal case. That argument suffers from the glaring problem that they chose to cooperate in return for the benefit of a lesser sentence, and that the choice to place themselves in that danger was theirs not that of the government. More fundamentally, petitioners fail to identify any legal authority for granting asylum on that basis. As we noted in Wang, “there are legal alternatives for an alien placed in danger by virtue of her cooperation with the government. . . . [T]he government may seek an ‘S-visa’ on behalf of an alien cooperating in a criminal investigation.” Wang, 445 F.3d at 999 n.2, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S)(I) and United States v. Zendeli, 180 F.3d 879, 881 (7th Cir. 1999). In this case as in Wang, the government has chosen not to pursue that option for reasons not clear on the record. The S-visa, not asylum, is the avenue by which the petitioners could lawfully remain in the United States, but that is not a hand that this court can force. Because the petitioners have failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground for purposes of asylum, they cannot meet the more stringent standards of withholding of removal which require a showing of a clear probability of persecution. Toure v. Holder, 624 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2010); Kaharudin v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2007).
The remaining arguments are similarly unavailing. The petitioners contest the denial of their request for a continuance of the hearing, asserting that it denied them due process because their counsel was not able to adequately develop their case. An immigration court’s denial of an alien’s request for a continuance is reviewable for abuse of discretion, but the petitioners have failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion here. Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 907, 915, 919 (7th Cir. 2010); Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 839-40 (2010). To the extent that they are claiming a due process violation, they fail for the additional reason that they have not adequately alleged prejudice from the denial of the continuance. Even before this court, they still have not identified what evidence they hoped to obtain by that continuance. A due process claim cannot succeed absent concrete evidence that the due process violation had the potential to affect the outcome of the hearing. Ambati v. Reno, 233 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 2000). Where a petitioner does not “set forth any evidence that would have been presented or arguments that would have been made had his counsel been given additional time to prepare his case,” the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the alleged violation potentially impacted the outcome of the hearing, and therefore the due process claim must be rejected. Id. at 1062; Kuciemba v. INS, 92 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir.1996.)
Moreover, the petitioners complain of the denial of their motion to remand, but again fail to allege with any specificity what evidence could have been obtained on that remand. The affidavits in support of that motion appear to establish at best that the government of Lithuania is unstable and does little to protect its citizens, but that helps the petitioners only if the actions against them by the private actor—Reika—were on account of one of the five protected grounds. They have failed to even argue that. The potential for private violence based on personal grudges, and the inability of a country to protect its citizens from such unlawfulness, is not a basis for asylum. As we noted, the government could have avoided this result by seeking an “S-visa” on behalf of the petitioners, but it did not do so. The asylum and withholding of removal limitations handcuff our ability to provide any relief here. The decision of the IJ and BIA is AFFIRMED. 

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Friday, July 22, 2011

Withholding of Removal, Macedonia Stanojkova v. Holder (7th Cir. 2011)

No. 10-3327 Decision Date: July 14, 2011 Petition granted

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=10-3327_002.pdf (PDF)

Record failed to support Bd.'s denial of application for withholding of removal by aliens (native of Macedonia) alleging that they were persecuted by members of paramilitary police in native country because of their sympathetic views of Albanian minority within native country. While Bd. believed that aliens' 10-minute confrontation with paramilitary police was insufficient to establish persecution claim, evidence was sufficient where: (1) alien claimed that police entered his home, rendered his parents unconscious, held gun to his head, and sexually assaulted his pregnant wife while accusing him of being against Macedonia; and (2) actual police were unwilling to arrest assailants. On remand, though, Bd. may consider improved conditions in Macedonia when evaluating alien's claim.

In Stanojkova v. Holder, 2011 WL 2725850 (7th Cir. 2011), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review filed by a Macedonian couple who claimed that they were victimized by rogue police officers, called “Lions,” on account of the male petitioner's refusal to report for duty with the Macedonia army due to his disapproval with his country's suppression of the Albanian minority. In remanding the matter back to the BIA to reassess whether the petitioners qualified for withholding of removal, the court took issue with the IJ's and the Board's prior determination that the mistreatment that they suffered, including a sexual assault of the wife-petitioner, constituted mere harassment as opposed to persecution. The court also pointed out that changed country conditions and the risk of future persecution were not addressed by the IJ or the Board in their prior deliberations, so those issues remained for consideration on remand.

Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court's three-judge panel, started his opinion by providing the historical context and demographics, noting that Macedonia emerged as a country after the breakup of Yugoslavia and is mostly Slavic with about a quarter of the population being of Albanian ethnicity. He observed that Albanian extremists began an insurrection in January 2001, but it “petered out” after the “Ohrid Framework Agreement” was negotiated in August 2001 to grant greater rights to the Albanian minority. During that time period, the male petitioner declined to report for military duty. Consequently, in 2002 three armed and masked men broke into the petitioners' home. They rendered the male petitioner's parents unconscious with a chemical spray and then proceeded to menace the male petitioner with a gun to his head, accusing him of being a “betrayer of Macedonians” for not participating in the war (against the Albanian minority). One of the assailants sexually assaulted his wife, who was pregnant at the time, and when the husband intervened, he was beaten on his head and back with a gun. The attackers left because of the wife's loud screams, and no actual rape occurred. Upon reporting this incident to the police, the petitioners were informed that the assailants were “Lions,” i.e., paramilitary police officers, with an implication that “ordinary” officers would not be able to afford protection. Consequently, the petitioners left their country.

They eventually came to the U.S. but without visas. In removal proceedings, they asked for asylum and related relief, but the IJ denied any relief, and the BIA, in a single-member decision, perfunctorily affirmed the IJ's removal order. As explained by Judge Posner, the petitioners missed the one-year filing deadline to be considered for asylum but remained eligible for withholding of removal (under INA § 241(b)(3) [8 USCA § 1231(b)(3)]. They did not press a CAT claim before the court. He further explained that to obtain withholding requires a demonstration that the applicant will more likely than not be subjected to persecution if removed from the U.S. and that a finding of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution pursuant to 8 CFR § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). He pointed out that the IJ, seconded by the BIA, ruled that the presumption was inapplicable because of their conclusion that the petitioners had not been persecuted.

Judge Posner described the IJ's decision as “garbled” on the issue of political motivation and criticized the IJ's statement that there was no evidence of human rights abuses by the Macedonian army in 2001 as ignoring the State Department's Country Report. He noted that the Board member found that the petitioners were credible but reasoned that the harm that they suffered during the home invasion did not rise to the level of persecution. He observed that neither the Board member nor the IJ made any effort to specify the amount of harm required to rise to the level of persecution and intimated that the court could not find a useful definition of persecution by the Board or the courts, although the importance of distinguishing between harassment and persecution has been noted. He remarked that “in terms of outcome the cases are all over the lot” and cited to an article by Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., “Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and Proposals for Reform” (2009), documenting this phenomenon. He referred to the Board's attempted definition of persecution in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), as “harm or suffering that is inflicted upon an individual for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome.” However, he described this definition as “vacuous with regard to the minimum amount of harm required.” He lamented the fact that “responsibility on this point of law has, by default, devolved on the courts, yet only provisionally - only until the Board assumes the responsibility - to try to create some minimum coherence in the adjudication of claims of persecution, as [the Seventh Circuit has] tried to do in the [instant]opinion.” He suggested that, in light of the current situation in Macedonia, there may well be less than a 50% probability that the petitioners would be persecuted if returned to Macedonia, which is the ultimate issue in a withholding case, but that this was a matter to be addressed by the Board or the IJ on remand.

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Thursday, June 16, 2011

ABRAHAM v. HOLDER, Seventh Circuit: Asylum/withholding of removal/lack of jurisdiction

ABRAHAM v. HOLDER-No. 10–2256. -- June 1, 2011

Download Original From the court

Petitioner, a native of Syria, entered the U.S. on a fiance visa, but did not marry within 90 days. More than a year after her visa expired, she conceded removability and sought asylum as a Christian, subject to persecution in a Muslim country. The immigration judge denied the petition as untimely and found that she did not establish a clear probability that she would be persecuted; the BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. An alien must apply for asylum within one year of arrival unless the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either changed circumstances which materially affect eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a); courts have no jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's determination. The denial of the petition to withhold removal was supported by substantial evidence.

"Almas Abraham petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal. Because we lack jurisdiction to review the Board's denial of her application for asylum in the circumstances presented here, we dismiss her petition with respect to asylum. We deny her petition with respect to her application for withholding of removal.

I.

Abraham is a native and citizen of Syria. She is also a Christian in a country where the vast majority of citizens are Muslims.2 Abraham entered the United States on May 17, 2004, at Chicago, with a K–1 nonimmigrant visa, which is also known as a “fiancé visa.” A fiancé visa permits a foreign citizen fiancé of a U.S. citizen to travel to the United States to marry his or her citizen sponsor within ninety days of arrival. See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(K)(i). Abraham did not marry her citizen sponsor within ninety days. She also failed to depart from the United States at the end of the ninety-day period. After overstaying her visa for more than a year, she filed an application for asylum on November 5, 2005.3 Abraham was served with a Notice to Appear charging that she was removable from the United States because she had remained longer than was permitted. She conceded that she was removable, and her application for asylum and withholding of removal proceeded to a full hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).

Abraham's testimony before the IJ was riddled with inconsistencies. She testified, for example, that she lived with her parents until she moved to Damascus, but she also testified that she spent a month living with Al–Deri's family after her family forced her to move out and before she moved to Damascus. She said that she began her relationship with Al–Deri in 2002 and that it went on for six or seven months before ending in June 2003. She later testified that the relationship began in 2001 and ended in August 2002. She told the IJ that she moved to Damascus in 2003 and became engaged to Dawood in April 2003, a time line that overlaps with her testimony that she broke off her relationship with Al–Deri in June 2003. She testified that she knew Dawood for only one week before becoming engaged to him and traveling to the United States, but she came to the United States in 2004, approximately one year after she claimed the engagement occurred. She testified that she lived with Dawood's aunt and his first cousin's family in Damascus and that the aunt introduced her to Dawood. But she also said that she lived in a church building that served as a refuge for people from Iraq, and that Dawood's aunt was the only member of his family living in the church. She testified that, except for the letter from her uncle, she had no contact with any members of her family after moving to Damascus, but she also submitted to the IJ a photocopy of a permanent resident card for one of her brothers who was living in the United States. And after telling the IJ she had no contact with her family after leaving for Damascus, she also told the IJ that “of course” her parents knew she was coming to the United States in 2004 because she had to gather all of her documents and papers in order to file the forms to come to the United States. She testified alternately that her family first learned of her relationship with Al–Deri in 2002 and in 2003.

She testified consistently that after moving to Damascus, she suffered no more abuse from her family or Al–Deri. She conceded that she never reported any abuse from her family or from Al–Deri to the police because she did not want anyone to know what had happened and because the police do not help in these cases. The Human Rights Report confirms that the police are rarely contacted and are not helpful when a report of domestic violence is lodged.5

When asked what would happen if she returned to Syria, Abraham testified, “Either they would shun me and because I wouldn't have any life to live there, I probably might kill myself.” R. at 129. She also testified that she feared harm from her family if she returned to Syria. Abraham also presented testimony from a cousin residing in the United States to corroborate her concern that her family might harm her if she returned to Syria. Her cousin testified that he believed Abraham would be the victim of an honor killing if she returned to Syria. He noted that he had a friend who served only three days in jail for killing his sister after she dishonored the family. The Human Rights Report also confirms that, until very recently, judges were allowed to waive or reduce punishment for perpetrators of honor killings. The law now stipulates a mandatory two-year minimum sentence for anyone convicted in an honor killing, but at the time Abraham left, a family member who killed her was unlikely to face significant legal sanctions. See Human Rights Report.

The IJ found that Abraham's asylum application was not timely filed and that she did not meet any of the exceptions for extending the time to file. The IJ concluded that Abraham did not meet the standards to qualify for withholding of removal or for relief under the Convention Against Torture, and therefore denied her application in its entirety. The IJ first noted that Abraham had failed to file her application for asylum within one year of arriving in the United States. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), a claim for asylum not filed within a year of arrival in the United States will be denied unless it meets one of the exceptions contained in the statute. The IJ rejected Abraham's argument that the letter from her uncle satisfied the only applicable exception for changed circumstances. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (permitting consideration of a late-filed application for asylum “if the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant's eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within the [one-year] period”). The IJ found that the letter did not meet the materiality requirement of the statute because the letter only repeated a threat to Abraham's safety that existed when she left Syria. Because those same circumstances existed when Abraham first arrived in the United States, the IJ found that she should be held to the one-year limit for filing claims for asylum. The IJ also noted that Abraham provided no information regarding the timing of her breakup with Dawood and thus it was impossible to determine whether she filed within a reasonable time after her nonimmigrant status expired. The IJ therefore denied the application for asylum as untimely.

The IJ then considered whether Abraham was eligible to be considered for withholding of removal. In order to qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate a clear probability that she will suffer persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion if she returns to her country of origin. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The IJ found that Abraham failed to demonstrate a “clear probability” that she would be persecuted on her return to Syria because her testimony was not credible, not persuasive, and not detailed enough to meet the standard of proof required. The IJ noted the multiple inconsistencies in Abraham's testimony and found that, absent corroboration, Abraham had not shown that it was more likely than not that she would be persecuted. The IJ also found that Abraham had failed to establish that she had been persecuted in the past on account of one of the protected grounds in the statute. Again finding that Abraham's testimony was not credible, the IJ also noted that the incidents of abuse she described were not severe, caused no injuries and required no medical treatment. Moreover, the IJ found that Abraham's stated intent to return to Syria even though these incidents occurred undermined her claim that she had been persecuted in Syria. The IJ also noted that Abraham was able to live in Damascus for some period of time without any further abuse from either her family or Al–Deri. The IJ therefore concluded that Abraham would not be seriously harmed if she returned to Syria. Finally, the IJ concluded that Abraham had also failed to establish that any abuse she suffered was due to one of the protected grounds in the statute.

Abraham appealed to the BIA. The BIA first agreed with the IJ that Abraham's claim for asylum was statutorily barred because it was untimely. The BIA then considered Abraham's claim for withholding of removal and concluded that she failed to present sufficient corroborating evidence of critical elements of her claim. After noting that Abraham could have obtained corroboration from her brother living in the United States, the people with whom she lived in Damascus, her uncle, or anyone else who knew her in Syria, the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ's denial of relief. Abraham's appeal was therefore dismissed.

II.

On appeal here, Abraham argues that the IJ and the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard to her application for asylum. She also asserts that the BIA's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Finally, she contends that we should reverse the decision denying her withholding of removal because the IJ and BIA ignored corroborating evidence that she provided and failed to forewarn her that they required additional corroborating evidence.

A.

Section 1158(a)(2) provides that an alien must apply for asylum within one year of the date of the alien's arrival in the United States unless “the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant's eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within the period specified[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) and (D). Section 1158 also provides that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). Therefore, in general, we lack jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's rejection of an untimely request for asylum. Restrepo v. Holder, 610 F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir.2010). Notwithstanding that limitation on our jurisdiction, we retain authority to review constitutional claims and questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).


In order to get around the limit on our jurisdiction, Abraham attempts to characterize her claim as one involving a question of law. A review of her brief, however, reveals that she simply disagrees with the IJ's conclusions regarding the facts of the case. In particular, she contests the IJ's conclusion that she did not present evidence of a “material” change in circumstances. The IJ's conclusion that Abraham lacked sufficient credible evidence to meet the materiality standard is not a question of law. Restrepo, 610 F.3d at 964–65 (noting that our circuit limits § 1252(a)(2)(D) to strictly legal controversies, and so we are not authorized to review applications of law to facts); Khan v. Filip, 554 F.3d 681, 687–89 (7th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1049 (2010) (concluding that our review under § 1252(a)(2)(D) is limited to “pure” questions of law); Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766, 768–69 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the agency's determination that an alien failed to file his asylum claim within one year and failed to qualify for an extension of time was an unreviewable question of fact and exercise of discretion). We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider Abraham's petition as it relates to her claim for asylum and dismiss that part of her petition.

B.

We turn next to Abraham's petition for review of the decision of the IJ and the BIA to deny her application for withholding of removal. Where the BIA's order adopts and supplements the IJ's decision, we review both. Surganova v. Holder, 612 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir.2010); Milanouic v. Holder, 591 F.3d 566, 570 (7th Cir.2010); Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 615 (7th Cir.2009); Khan, 554 F.3d at 690. We examine the IJ's factual findings deferentially and uphold them so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 615; Khan, 554 F.3d at 690; Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir.2004). Under the substantial evidence test, we must uphold the IJ's findings if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. Balogun, 374 F.3d at 498. We may reverse the IJ's determinations only if the evidence compels a different result. Balogun, 374 F.3d at 498.

Credibility determinations are questions of fact subject to this standard of review. Balogun, 374 F.3d at 498. See also Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 617 (holding that only in extraordinary circumstances will this court overturn an IJ's credibility assessment). The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005, sets forth the parameters for the Immigration Judge's credibility determinations:

Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant's or witness's account, the consistency between the applicant's or witness's written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's claim, or any other relevant factor․

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The REAL ID Act also modified the INA to allow immigration judges substantial discretion “to demand corroboration of an asylum applicant's allegations whether or not the judge finds the applicant credible.” Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 618. “Only if such evidence is beyond the reasonable ability of the immigrant to obtain is the judge precluded from demanding corroboration.” Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 618; 8 U.S .C. § 1252(b)(4); Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 381 (7th Cir.2008).

In this case, the IJ expressly found that Abraham's testimony was not credible. That finding was well-supported by the numerous internal inconsistencies in her testimony. As we noted above, she testified inconsistently on a number of issues including: (1) her living situation after Al–Deri told her family about the relationship; (2) the time line for her relationship with Al–Deri, her move to Damascus, and her engagement to Dawood; (3) whether she had any contact with her family after moving to Damascus; and (4) whether her relationship with Al–Deri was consensual or forced upon her. We will not disturb the IJ's credibility finding because it is supported by substantial evidence.

Nor is there any reason to overturn the decision of the IJ or the BIA requiring that Abraham produce corroboration of her claims. We cannot say that it would have been unreasonable in these circumstances to require corroboration because Abraham had contacts in Damascus who could verify her story, and also appears to have been in contact with her uncle and with a brother in the United States. Abraham complains that if the IJ wished for her to produce corroborative evidence, she should have been given notice of this requirement. But the REAL ID Act:

clearly states that corroborative evidence may be required, placing immigrants on notice of the consequences for failing to provide corroborative evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”). To hold that a petitioner must receive additional notice from the IJ and then an additional opportunity to provide corroborative evidence before an adverse ruling, would necessitate two hearings—the first to decide whether such corroborating evidence is required and then another hearing after a recess to allow the alien more time to collect such evidence. This would add to the already overburdened resources of the DHS, and such an approach would seem imprudent where the law clearly notifies aliens of the importance of corroborative evidence.

Raphael v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th Cir.2008). There is therefore no need for additional notice. Abraham notes that the IJ and BIA did not address the testimony given by her cousin that she would be the victim of an honor killing on her return to Syria. That testimony did corroborate that honor killings occur in Syria and that punishment for the killers is virtually nonexistent. The cousin also stated his opinion that Abraham would be the victim of an honor killing if she returned to Syria. Although the IJ and BIA did not expressly mention this testimony, the IJ did not dispute that honor killings occurred in Syria and agreed that they are a “terrible problem” there. Oral Decision of the IJ (August 7, 2008), at 13. But the IJ found that, in light of all of the evidence, and because Abraham's family and former boyfriend did not disturb her after she moved to Damascus, it was unlikely that they would harm her if she returned to Syria. Having reviewed the short and conclusory testimony of Abraham's cousin, we conclude that no further analysis by the IJ or the BIA was necessary. It is clear from the record and from the IJ's decision that the IJ understood all of the evidence presented and still found Abraham's proof lacking. See Kiorkis v. Holder, 634 F.3d 924, 928–29 (7th Cir.2011) (recognizing that it is impossible for immigration courts to write an exegesis on every contention an applicant raises).

In short, the IJ found that Abraham did not produce sufficient credible evidence that she had suffered past persecution or would suffer persecution on her return to Syria. The IJ and BIA concluded that Abraham also failed to provide corroborating evidence of her claim in circumstances where it was not unreasonable to require her to produce corroboration. Because the decisions of the IJ and BIA are supported by substantial evidence, Abraham's petition regarding withholding of removal is denied.


Dismissed in Part and Denied in Part."

FOOTNOTES

2.  Seventy-four percent of Syrians are Sunni Muslims. Christians comprise approximately 10% of the Syrian population. See United States Department of State, Background Note: Syria, http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm (last visited May 10, 2011) (hereafter “State Dept. Report”).

3.  An application for asylum is automatically considered a request for withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (“An asylum application shall be deemed to constitute at the same time an application for withholding of removal, unless adjudicated in deportation or exclusion proceedings commenced prior to April 1, 1997.”).

4.  Like much of Abraham's testimony, her account of her relationship with Al–Deri contains a number of seeming inconsistencies. She twice described the relationship as a “dating relationship,” but also said it was “forced” and “not voluntary.” R. at 125, 132–33. At one point, she testified, “It was like he fall [sic] in love with me and he wanted me and I couldn't do anything about it.” R. at 124. She also said that Al–Deri blamed her for starting the relationship and that for a time, she also blamed herself. R. at 132–33.

5.  According to the Human Rights Report, “The law does not specifically prohibit domestic violence, and violence against women occurred during the year. A 2006 study reported that as many as one in four women surveyed had been victims of domestic violence. The majority of domestic violence and sexual assault cases went unreported; victims have traditionally been reluctant to seek assistance outside the family for fear of social stigmatization. Observers reported that when some abused women tried to file a police report, the police did not respond to their claims aggressively, if at all. Women reported incidents at police stations of sexual harassment, verbal abuse, hair pulling, and slapping by police officers when attempting to file police reports, particularly at the criminal security branch at Bab Musallah in Damascus. Victims of domestic violence have the legal right to seek redress in court, but few did so because of the social stigma attached to such action.”

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Friday, April 8, 2011

Chinese asylum, Christian faith, past persecution. Ni v. Holder (7th Cir., March 25, 2011)

Bd. did not err in denying asylum request by alien (native of China) after finding that alien had failed to establish that he had personally been victim of past persecution on basis of his Christian religion or that he was exposed to individualized risk of future persecution. Alien typically cannot establish past persecution claim based upon persecution of third-party, and instant alien failed to show that physical beating of his parents due to their Christian religion was meant as act to injure him. Moreover, alien failed to establish well-founded fear of future persecution where: (1) persecution of parents occurred over 20 years ago; (2) record failed to show that Chinese officials have continued to target his family; and (3) alien failed to present evidence about conditions in area of China to which he would return.

Chinese petitioner appeals the BIA’s denial of his asylum claim on account of his Christian faith.  The Petitioner’s claim is premised principally on persecution that his parent’s suffered in 1982.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the agency’s dismissal, finding the petitioner did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Read the opinion here.
FLAUM, Evans, McCuskey (distct)
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=10-1691_002.pdf

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Non-LPR cancellation & possession of drug paraphernalia. Barma v. Holder (7th Cir., April 5, 2011)

Bd. did not err in finding that alien (native of Canada) was subject to removal based on his presence in US beyond his 6-month visa, and that alien did not qualify for cancellation of removal under 8 USC section 1182(a)(2) where alien had prior conviction on charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. Bd. could properly view prior conviction as one relating to controlled substance, which precluded any attempt by alien to cancel his removal, and Ct. rejected alien's claim that he was eligible to have said disqualifying offense waived under section 1182(h).

Petitioner, who has a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia, appeals the agency’s determination that he was ineligible for Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) on the grounds that he was convicted of a crime under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).  Petitioner argues that he is eligible for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) for his drug paraphernalia offense making him thus eligible for Non-LPR cancellation.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the agency’s determination finding that the statutory provisions for Non-LPR cancellation expressly did not incorporate the waiver provision under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) in consideration of eligibility for Non-LPR cancellation.
Read the opinion here.
ROVNER, Easterbrook, Posner
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=09-4135_002.pdf

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Reinstatement removal order: Tapia-Lemos v. Holder (7th Cir., April 7, 2011)

The Seventh Circuit dismissed petitioner’s petition for review from a reinstatement removal order finding that petitioner had failed to file within the statutorily required 30 days after the reinstatement was entered. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).  The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that the 30 days should run from the date the removal order was received.  The Court further rejected petitioner’s arguments that the Court’s denial of a stay on January 18, 2011 be treated as either a new removal order or as a denial of a motion to reopen, triggering a new filing deadline.

Read the opinion here.
EASTERBROOK, Coffey, Rovner
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbr&shofile=11-1386_001.pdf

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Thursday, March 24, 2011

Lin Jiang, Seventh Circuit: Asylum/Motion to Reopen/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Changed Country Conditions

Lin Jiang v. Eric Holder, Jr., 09-3179
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Friday, March 18th, 2011
Status: Published/Precedential
Lin_Jiang_v._Eric_Holder_Jr..pdf 


In Lin Xing Jiang v. Holder, 2011 WL 923279 (7th Cir. 2011), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review filed by a citizen of China who had unsuccessfully endeavored to reopen her completed removal proceeding in order to advance new claims for asylum based on her contention that her previous attorney had neglected to present a claim of religious persecution to the immigration court and on her alleged fear of persecution due to having giving birth to two children in the U.S. The circuit court ruled that the Board's decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion inasmuch as the petitioner had not complied with the procedural requirements pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims and she had not established changed country conditions in her native China in order to excuse her belated motion to reopen (MTR).

The petitioner came to the U. S. Virgin Islands in 2000 and was subsequently placed into removal proceedings for being present in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled. She filed for asylum, claiming that she had been forced to abort a pregnancy by the Chinese government. The IJ concluded that her story was not credible and thus denied her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. She appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA, which affirmed the decision without an accompanying opinion. Over four years later, well-beyond the 90-day statutory period, she filed her MTR seeking an exemption based on changed country conditions, citing 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(3)(i). She asserted, for the first time, that she feared persecution based on her Catholic religion. She also cited, as new evidence, the fact that, since the time of her immigration court hearing, she had given birth to two children in the U.S. in violation of China's family planning policies. In addition, she averred that circumstances had worsened for practicing Catholics in China and that, should the U.S. remove her to her country, she would return to her former underground church and risk persecution. She also related that, although she had told her immigration lawyer that she had grown up as a Catholic in China, he did not include a claim for religious persecution in her initial petition for asylum.

In rejecting this MTR, the Board concluded that the petitioner had not submitted adequate evidence that members of underground churches were in more danger than they had been at the time of her hearing in 2002. The Board noted that the petitioner neither specifically claimed that her former attorney had been ineffective nor complied with the requisite procedural formalities for an IAC claim. In a footnote, the Board identified an additional procedural deformity by virtue of the petitioner's failure to submit a new application as part of the MTR.

Before the circuit court, the petitioner conceded that the evidence presented with her motion was not technically “new” evidence. She asserted, however, that it was not available at the initial hearing before the IJ because her attorney failed to present it, thus depriving her of the opportunity to present all of her persecution claims. Citing to Toure v. Holder, 624 F.3d 422 (7th Cir. 2010), the court pointed out that asylum seekers hold no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but that it has recognized that the denial of effective assistance of counsel may, under certain circumstances, violate the due process guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. It noted that the Board has historically acknowledged this potential for a due process violation and has formulated explicit requirements for a litigant to advance an IAC claim in a precedent decision, Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988). Explaining that the court has previously upheld the Lozada protocol (including the necessity to provide an affidavit establishing the agreement with counsel, provision of notice to counsel with an opportunity to respond to the allegations, and filing of a complaint with the governing disciplinary authorities or explaining why this was not accomplished), the court observed that the petitioner failed to satisfy any of the Lozada requirements or to even articulate a specific claim of IAC.

The court also concluded that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that there were material changes in the relevant circumstances in China, declaring that cumulative evidence that the conditions asserted in the original application persisted fails to meet this burden. The court took judicial notice of the State Department's 2009 Country Report, which actually offers a glimmer of hope for practicing Catholics as it suggests a relaxation of controls over their unregistered churches. In regard to the petitioner's expression of concern for having two children in the U.S. in contravention of China's one-child policy, the court cited to its prior decision in Cheng Chen v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2007), which held that an asylum applicant cannot claim changed country conditions based on her own actions in the U.S. when the conditions in the country of origin have not materially changed. In light of the failure of the petitioner to have timely petitioned the court following the BIA's initial decision against her, the court declined to address her arguments regarding the merits of her original asylum claim.

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture or CAT), was opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the U.S. Apr. 18, 1988).

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Friday, January 28, 2011

Seventh Circuit finds BIA summary affirmance procedure to benefit noncitizens and not just DHS

Ward v. Holder No. 10-2063 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 1184 (January 21, 2011)

A petition for review, by natives and citizens of Philippines, a BIA's affirmance of an IJ's finding that petitioners are removable from the United States under 8 U.S.C. section 1227(a)(1) and ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. section 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), is denied as, while it may be prudent to require that certain appeals to the BIA be adjudicated by a three-member panel instead of a single member acting alone, the BIA did not violate the review procedures set forth in section 1003.1(e) when a single member rendered a decision on petitioners' appeal in his discretion without referring it to a panel of three. 

Ms. Ward and her daughter entered the United States on a K visa march 2004. Ms. Ward married her U.S. citizen fiancé May 2004. The marriage dissolved shortly thereafter without a filing of an adjustment of status application. Ms. Ward was placed in removal proceedings November 2006. Ms. Ward submitted a VAWA self petition which was denied April 2007. In December 2008 an immigration judge denied her application for VAWA cancellation finding that Ms. Ward was by "clear and convincing evidence" ineligible for cancellation. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision on March 31, 2010; a single board member issued a three page decision.

Ms. Ward’s counsel appealed to the Seventh Circuit arguing that the lengthy opinion demonstrated that the board member went beyond the scope of his power to affirm, modify, or remand an immigration decision in a "brief order" pursuant to 8 CFR Sec. 1003.1(e)(5). In other words, if the case merited a decision of such length, then it merited a three-judge panel review.

The Seventh Circuit in Martinez-Camargo v. INS 282 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2002) established a two-pronged test to evaluate whether the failure to adhere to an immigration administrative guideline rendered the underlying action taken invalid. The first prong is to ask whether the regulation in question serves a "purpose of benefit to the alien." The government in the present case argued that Sec. 1003.1(e)(5) was a case management regulation to help the Board handle cases and therefore not intended to benefit the alien. The Seventh Circuit disagreed stating that "The fact that the presence of a ‘need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination’ is a basis for three-member panel review underscores that the regulations were designed in the interest of justice as well as efficiency."

The second Martinez-Camargo prong requires the court to determine whether the alleged violation of the regulation set forth therein prejudices the petitioner. The Circuit found that there was neither prejudice nor a violation. 8 CFR Sec. 1003.1(e)(5) has been found not to be prejudicial in general. As to the plaintiff’s contention that the fact that the BIA board member issued a longer than average decision was not conceivable under the regulatory scheme, the circuit countered that "To require referral to a three-member panel in each case that lends itself to more than a cookie-cutter order would be contrary to the plain language of Sec. 1003.1(e)."
______________________________
WARD v. HOLDER

Elizabeth P. WARD, individually and as parent and natural guardian to Estefanie Ebrada Cainto, a minor child, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.

No. 10-2063.

Argued Nov. 4, 2010. -- January 21, 2011
Before BAUER, MANION and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Daniel P. Cory, Plews, Shadley, Racher & Braun, South Bend, IN, for Petitioners.Timothy G. Hayes, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Petitioners seek review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) upholding an immigration judge's finding that they are removable from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) and ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii). Petitioners contend that a single member of the BIA issued an improper written opinion that went beyond the scope of an individual BIA member's power to affirm, modify, or remand an immigration judge's decision in a “brief order” pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5). This court's jurisdiction over final orders of removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The written order issued by the BIA on March 31, 2010 constitutes a final order of removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7); therefore the case is properly before this court.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Ward and her daughter Cainto, natives and citizens of the Philippines, entered the United States in March 2004 on non-immigrant K visas. Ward entered on a K-1 visa as the fiancée of a United States citizen and Cainto entered on a K-2 visa as a minor child accompanying her mother to the United States.

Ward married her citizen fiancé in May 2004. The marriage dissolved shortly thereafter and Ward never applied for permanent resident status based upon her marriage. In November 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) ordered petitioners to appear before an immigration judge to explain why they should not be removed from the United States for having overstayed their visas. Prior to her removal hearing, Ward petitioned DHS for an immigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), a statute which enables the former spouse of a United States citizen who was subjected to battery or extreme cruelty to remain in the United States. DHS denied Ward's petition for this special visa in April 2007. In December 2008, an immigration judge conducted a merits hearing to adjudicate whether petitioners were removable and, if so, whether their application for cancellation of removal was properly denied. The immigration judge found that removability had been established by evidence that was “clear and convincing” and that petitioners were ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed in a three-page decision issued by a single member on March 31, 2010.

II. DISCUSSION

Petitioners urge us to remand their case to the BIA with instructions to review their appeal in a three-member panel. In their view, the order issued by a single member pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5) overstepped the BIA's own bounds for reviewing immigration appeals in such a manner. For the reasons described below, we decline to grant petitioners the relief they seek in this matter.

We begin with the question of jurisdiction. Only constitutional claims and questions of law properly raised in connection with an order of removal are reviewable. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Legal questions include “challenges to the BIA's interpretation of a statute, regulation, or constitutional provision, claims that the BIA misread its own precedent or applied the wrong legal standard, or claims that the BIA failed to exercise discretion at all.” Patel v. Holder, 563 F.3d 565, 568 (7th Cir.2009). We find that the question raised by petitioners is a legal one, since it involves interpretation of the guidelines set for review of immigration appeals under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e).

In the immigration context, a two-pronged analysis governs whether failure to adhere to an administrative guideline renders the underlying action taken invalid. First, the regulation in question must serve a “purpose of benefit to the alien.” Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Matter of Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 325 (B.I.A.1980). If the regulation is found to serve a purpose of benefit to the alien, the action is then invalid only if the violation “prejudiced the interests of the alien protected by the regulation.” Id. As the BIA itself put it in Garcia-Flores, “where an entire procedural framework, designed to insure the fair processing of an action affecting an individual is created but then not followed by an agency, it can be deemed prejudicial.” Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. at 329. The analysis adopted in Martinez-Camargo endeavors to strike a balance between “recognizing the need for administrative agencies to follow their own rules” and acknowledging “the practical reality that not every agency violation impacts an alien's substantive rights.” Martinez-Camargo, 282 F.3d at 491. In order to assess whether the regulation serves a purpose of benefit to the alien, we must first look to the language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.

Section 1003.1 of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs the organization, jurisdiction, and powers of the BIA. Under subsection (e)(3), a single board member is initially assigned to an appeal using the BIA's case management system. The member assigned to that appeal is then vested with the authority to determine how it should be handled by the BIA. The member may summarily dismiss the appeal once the record is complete or may elect to have the case decided on the merits. A decision on the merits is issued in one of three ways. In the most straightforward cases, a formulaic “affirmance without opinion” is issued by the member pursuant to subsection (e)(4). In cases requiring more in-depth analysis, the member may issue a brief order pursuant to subsection (e)(5) or designate the appeal for review by a three-member panel pursuant to subsection (e)(6). The default is single member review. (“[T]he Board member shall issue a brief order ․ unless the Board member designates the case for decision by a three-member panel under paragraph (e)(6)․” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5) (emphasis added).

Various circumstances set forth in subsection (e)(6) provide a basis for referral of an appeal to a three-member panel. These circumstances include the need to settle inconsistencies among rulings of different judges, the need to establish precedent, the need to review a decision not in conformity with the law, and the need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination by a judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6). While we agree with the respondent that a “designed effect” of the case management provisions set forth in § 1003.1(e) is to assist the BIA in managing its caseload, we find that the provisions nonetheless serve a purpose of benefit to the alien. Though settling inconsistencies and establishing precedent undoubtedly assists the BIA in managing its caseload, such action is also designed to rectify errors below that may have unfairly prejudiced an alien. The fact that the presence of a “need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination” is a basis for three-member panel review underscores that the regulations were designed in the interests of justice as well as efficiency.

Having found that § 1003.1(e) serves a purpose of benefit to aliens, we are left to consider whether a violation of the regulations set forth therein prejudiced petitioners. Since we have held that a streamlined review process withstands constitutional challenges on due process grounds1 , absent a violation of the applicable streamlining procedures, petitioners cannot be entitled to relief.

The § 1003.1(e) streamlining procedures afford the single member initially assigned to any given appeal significant discretion. Prior to the enactment of subsection (e)(5) in 2002, a single member could only affirm without opinion. By adopting subsection (e)(5), the drafters intentionally expanded single member review. Subsection (e)(5) now gives BIA members the power to modify and remand the decisions of immigration judges in their sole discretion. It also confers upon them the right to explain their decisions if they don't feel a formulaic disposition of the appeal is appropriate. While subsection (e)(5) provides that a single member may refer an appeal to a three-member panel, this court has not interpreted the subsection to require such a referral. See Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir.2006). The fact that petitioners' appeal may have been eligible for review by a three-member panel under the standards of the BIA's case management plan but was instead reviewed by a single member acting alone is irrelevant. In our view, it is apparent from the plain language of § 1003.1(e) that discretion in these matters is left to the panel member assigned to the case.

The heart of petitioners' argument is that the decision issued by a single BIA member in the case was not a “brief” order, as the language of subsection (e)(5) describes. Because the decision was perhaps lengthier than the average single-member decision, they argue the decision could only have appropriately been rendered by a three-member panel. This dogged focus on what is or is not “brief” provides no substantive evidence of abuse of discretion under the guidelines. To require referral to a three-member panel in each case that lends itself to more than a cookie-cutter order would be contrary to the plain language of § 1003.1(e). It would also “greatly weaken the designed effect [of the regulations] by encouraging BIA members to ignore the subsection (e)(5) procedure altogether and send anything requiring elaboration to a three-member panel.” Id. at 692. We find that the language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 is sufficiently clear in allowing a single member of the BIA to issue an order such as the one rendered in petitioners' case. Ergo, we cannot find that the BIA violated the review procedures set forth in § 1003.1(e) when a single member rendered a decision on petitioners' appeal in his discretion without referring it to a panel of three. Having found no violation, we need not consider whether petitioners were prejudiced by the way the appeal was handled.

III. CONCLUSION

While it may be prudent to require that certain appeals to the BIA be adjudicated by a three-member panel instead of a single member acting alone, we leave it to the drafters of the regulations to enact such a change if they find it to be necessary. In so doing, we preserve the spirit of judicial restraint that has long guided appellate review of administrative agency rules. Petitioners' request to have their appeal remanded for further proceedings before a three-member panel of the BIA is Denied.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir.2006) (citing Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962 (7th Cir.2003)).

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Thursday, January 13, 2011

ALVARADO FONSECA v. HOLDER- Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, ex post facto clause 7th Circuit

A Mexican citizen's petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of an IJ's deportation order on the ground that his 1984 state court conviction for armed robbery constituted an aggravated felony, is denied where: 1) because petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, his argument that Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, section 7344(b) bars his deportation, cannot be considered; and 2) In light of the Supreme Court's statement in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) that, deportation "is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction," Padilla does not provide sufficient guidance to deviate from the long line cases establishing that statutes retroactively setting criteria for deportation do not violate the ex post facto clause.


Clemente ALVARADO-FONSECA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Respondent.

No. 10-1917.

Argued Dec. 3, 2010. -- January 06, 2011
Before FLAUM, ROVNER and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

An immigration judge ordered Clemente Alvarado-Fonseca, a Mexican citizen, removed to Mexico on the ground that his 1984 state court conviction for armed robbery constituted an aggravated felony, a deportable offense. On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), Alvarado-Fonseca argued that he was not removable because the definition of aggravated felony in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) could not be applied retroactively. The BIA dismissed the appeal. Alvarado-Fonseca now argues that a provision in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (“ADAA”) precludes his deportation. Alvarado-Fonseca waived that argument by failing to raise it before the BIA. In light of that failure to exhaust, we must deny the petition.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Alvarado-Fonseca, a citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident alien on April 27, 1973, at the age of ten. In 1984, a twenty-one-year-old Alvarado-Fonseca was convicted of armed robbery in Illinois state court, and was sentenced to six-years in prison. Now 47 years old, Alvarado-Fonseca has since married a United States citizen, with whom he has two children.

On April 2, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Alvarado-Fonseca by filing a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) against him in the Immigration Court. The NTA charged that Alvarado-Fonseca was removable from the United States under three provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”): (1) section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) for conviction of an aggravated felony relating to a theft or burglary offense as defined in § 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43)(G)); (2) section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) for conviction of an aggravated felony relating to a crime of violence as defined in § 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43)(F)); and (3) section 237(a)(2)(C) for a conviction that involved the use or possession of a firearm (see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C)).

B. Statutory Background

The thrust of Alvarado-Fonseca's argument in this Court turns on the interplay of several amendments to the federal immigration laws. A short discussion of each of the relevant enactments is helpful.

1. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988

Congress first made conviction for an “aggravated felony” a deportable offense in 1988, when it amended the INA through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (“ADAA”). See ADAA § 7344(a). At that time, the statutory definition of “aggravated felony” did not include theft offenses or crimes of violence. Section 7344(b) of the ADAA provided that the amendments applied only “to any alien who has been convicted, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, of an aggravated felony.” Therefore, under the ADAA, only aliens convicted of an aggravated felony on or after November 18, 1988 were deportable. In his petition, Alvarado-Fonseca relies on the temporal restriction set forth in ADAA § 7344(b) for his position that he cannot be deported for his 1984 conviction.

2. The Immigration Act of 1990

In 1990, Congress enacted the IMMAct, § 501(a) of which broadened the definition of “aggravated felony” to include any crime of violence for which a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years is imposed. The new definition applied only to crimes committed on or after November 29, 1990. See IMMAct § 501(b).

Section 602(c) of the IMMAct provided:

SAVINGS PROVISION.-Notwithstanding the amendments made by this section, any alien who was deportable because of a conviction (before the date of the enactment of this Act) of an offense referred to in paragraph (15), (16), (17), or (18) of section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall be considered to remain so deportable. Except as otherwise specifically provided in such section and subsection (d), the provisions of such section, as amended by this section, shall apply to all aliens described in subsection (a) thereof notwithstanding that (1) any such alien entered the United States before the date of enactment of this Act, or (2) the facts, by reason of which an alien is described in such subsection, occurred before the date of the enactment of this Act.

See 104 Stat. 5081-82 (1990).

3. The Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 1994

On October 25, 1994, Congress again broadened the definition of “aggravated felony” to include theft offenses for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least five years. See ITCA § 222(a). The ITCA provided that “[t]he amendments made by ․ section [222(a) ] shall apply to convictions entered on or after the date of enactment of this Act.” ITCA § 222(b).

4. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

Congress revisited the definition of “aggravated felony” again in 1996 with the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). See IIRIRA § 321(a). Section 321(b) of IIRIRA amended the INA to read: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), [the amended definition of aggravated felony] applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996.” Section 321(c) of IIRIRA states that “[t]he amendments made by this section shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred.”

C. Procedural Background

In the proceedings before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Alvarado-Fonseca contended that he had previously appeared before an IJ and had been granted a waiver of deportation; however he could produce no evidence of such a waiver. Alvarado-Fonseca also applied for cancellation of removal. On April 14, 2009, the IJ concluded in a written opinion that Alvarado-Fonseca was removable on all three charges based on his conviction for armed robbery. Specifically, the IJ found that armed robbery “certainly is an offense relating to a theft offense, identified in § 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA.” Furthermore, the IJ determined that armed robbery constitutes a crime of violence as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(F) because it involves a clear risk of harm to an individual. Finally, the IJ found that Alvarado-Fonseca was removable pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(C) because he had been convicted of a crime that involved the use or possession of a firearm. The IJ dismissed Alvarado-Fonseca's application for cancellation of removal, concluding that he was ineligible for cancellation because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (barring a permanent resident alien from eligibility for cancellation of removal if he has been convicted of an aggravated felony).

On appeal of the IJ's decision to the BIA, Alvarado-Fonseca argued that he was not removable pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(C) because he had not been convicted of a firearm offense.1 Alvarado-Fonseca also maintained that, because he was not deportable at the time he was convicted, he cannot be removed today. Specifically, Alvarado-Fonseca argued that the IIRIRA's expanded the definition of “aggravated felony”-enacted in 1996-could not be applied to his 1984 conviction because (1) there is a presumption against retroactive application, and (2) retroactive application would violate his due process rights.

On March 17, 2010, the BIA dismissed Alvarado-Fonseca's appeal, rejecting Alvarado-Fonseca's argument that the IIRIRA's aggravated felony provision should not apply retroactively. For that conclusion the BIA relied in part on our decision in Flores-Leon v. INS, 272 F.3d 433 (7th Cir.2001), which we discuss further below. The BIA did not determine whether Alvarado-Fonseca was removable under § 237(a)(2)(C), noting that even if he was not, he had failed to establish that he was not otherwise removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).

II. Discussion

Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review an order removing an alien who has been convicted of committing an “aggravated felony.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); Gaiskov v. Holder, 567 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir.2009). However, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we have jurisdiction to review questions of law and constitutional claims. Here, Alvarado-Fonseca raises legal questions regarding the interpretation of the aggravated felony provisions of the INA and a constitutional claim founded on the ex post facto clause. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to consider the petition. While we review questions of law and constitutional claims de novo, we defer to the BIA's reasonable interpretation of the INA, “so long as it is ‘consistent with the language and purposes of the statute.’ “ Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 763 (7th Cir.2005).

A. Exhaustion

In the instant petition, Alvarado-Fonseca effectively concedes that he is removable under our decision in Flores-Leon v. INS, 272 F.3d 433 (7th Cir.2001), but argues that we instead should follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ledezma-Galicia v. Holder, 599 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir.2010). As the discussion below demonstrates, contrary to Alvarado-Fonseca's interpretation, the two cases are not necessarily in conflict. More importantly, Alvarado-Fonseca's failure to raise before the BIA the arguments addressed in Ledezma-Galicia, which he effectively adopts in his petition, precludes us from considering this line of reasoning.

In Flores-Leon, we squarely rejected the argument Alvarado-Fonseca advanced before the BIA-namely, that the IIRIRA's definition of aggravated felony cannot be applied retroactively. The petitioner in Flores-Leon had been convicted in 1994 of a crime that was not classified as an aggravated felony until 1996. We concluded that the amended definition could be applied to the earlier conviction, holding that “the amended definition of ‘aggravated felony’ [set forth in IIRIRA § 321(a) ] should be applied to any and all criminal violations committed by an alien after his or her entry into the United States, regardless of whether they were committed before or after the amended definition went into effect.” 272 F.3d at 439. We reasoned that Congress had “clearly manifested an intent to apply the amended definition of ‘aggravated felony’ retroactively” in IIRIRA § 321(b), which states that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), [the amended definition of aggravated felony] applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996.” Id.

Ledezma-Galicia involved a petitioner who, like Alvarado-Fonseca and unlike Flores-Leon, was convicted before Congress enacted the ADAA in 1988, thereby making conviction for an “aggravated felony” a deportable offense for the first time. 599 F.3d at 1058. Ledezma-Galicia argued that the temporal limitation set forth in ADAA § 7344(b) remains in effect and prohibits his removal. Id. at 1061. The government responded that the ADAA's temporal limitation on the aggravated felony ground of deportation did not survive the later passage of the IMMAct in 1990 and the IIRIRA in 1996. Specifically, the government argued that IMMAct § 602(c) and IIRIRA § 321(b) override ADAA § 7344(b). Id. In a split decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected both of the government's arguments and found that the petitioner could not be deported.

With respect to IIRIRA § 321 (the only provision at issue in Flores-Leon ), the Ninth Circuit stated that “it is settled law that the ․ definitional statute, IIRIRA § 321, which defines certain crimes as aggravated felonies, applies regardless of the date of the crime.” Id. at 1074 (quoting Lopez-Castellanos v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir.2006)) (emphasis in original). That is precisely what we said in Flores-Leon. The Ledezma-Galicia court went on to explain that, under Ninth Circuit precedent, “the IIRIRA's effective date provisions do not control ‘the substantive immigration consequences of IIRIRA’ (emphasis added)-even when those consequences turn on an aggravated felony conviction.” Id. (quoting Lopez-Castellanos, 437 F.3d at 852-54). In other words, the Ninth Circuit has held that while the definition of “aggravated felony” applies to all aliens, that does not necessarily mean that all aliens convicted of an aggravated felony can be deported as a result. We have never explicitly considered whether the consequences of being an aggravated felon, such as removability, should be considered separately from the definition. Flores-Leon may be read as implicitly holding that both the definition and consequences of being an aggravated felon apply retroactively. But even if that is the case, such that our case law is in conflict with the Ninth Circuit's, we cannot resolve that tension here, for the reasons below.

The Ledezma-Galicia court went on to conclude that nothing in the IIRIRA affected the temporal limitation set forth in ADAA § 7344(b). 599 F.3d at 1074-75. It also found that IMMAct § 602(c) does not override ADAA § 7344(b). In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit refused to defer to the BIA's contrary interpretation that the second sentence of IMMAct § 602(c) overrides ADAA § 7344(b)). Id. at 1062-73. Based on those determinations, the Ninth Circuit found that Ledezma-Galicia was not removable as an aggravated felon.

Thus, the decision on which Alvarado-Fonseca now relies turns on ADAA § 7344(b), and its relationship to IIRIRA § 321(b) and IMMAct § 602(c). By relying on Ledezma-Galicia, Alvarado-Fonseca is asking us to consider whether ADAA § 7344(b) remains in effect.2 But Alvarado-Fonseca did not raise the potential relevance of either ADAA § 7344(b) or IMMAct § 602(c) before the IJ or the BIA. Rather, in his administrative proceedings, Alvarado-Fonseca focused on the fact that he was convicted before the IIRIRA was enacted in 1996; now he bases his argument on the fact that he was convicted before the 1988 passage of the ADAA.

Consequently, as the government contends, Alvarado-Fonseca failed to exhaust the argument he now advances.3 “An alien ordered removed from this country is required to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him before seeking judicial review of the removal order.” Ghaffar v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir.2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if ․ the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right”). Part of the duty to exhaust is the obligation to present all arguments to the BIA in the first instance that it has the power to address. Ghaffar, 551 F.3d at 655. Because Alvarado-Fonseca failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, we cannot consider his argument that ADAA § 7344(b) bars his deportation.

By requiring that the BIA be given the first opportunity to consider questions of law under the INA, the exhaustion requirement acknowledges and respects the BIA's role as the primary interpreter of immigration law, as well as its expertise in interpreting the INA. Zeqiri v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 364, 369-70 (7th Cir.2008). It would undermine the BIA's authority to ignore the exhaustion requirement here.4

B. Ex Post Facto Clause

Alvarado-Fonseca also contends that deporting him for the commission of an aggravated felony would violate the ex post facto clause, which prohibits the retroactive application of criminal laws that materially disadvantage the defendant. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Flores-Leon, 272 F.3d at 440. Alvarado-Fonseca concedes that the ex post facto clause applies only to criminal laws, and that both this circuit and the Supreme Court have long held that removal under the immigration laws is a civil proceeding, not a criminal punishment. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954) (“And whatever might have been said at an earlier date for applying the ex post facto Clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this Court that it has no application to deportation.”); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir.2004); Flores-Leon, 272 F.3d at 440. However, he argues that we should revisit that conclusion in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision Padilla v. Kentucky, --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010).

In Padilla, the Court held that counsel for an alien charged with a crime has a constitutional obligation to tell the client that a guilty plea carries a risk of deportation. Id. at 1486. In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that “deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty,’ “ and that removal proceedings, while “civil in nature,” are “intimately related to the criminal process.” Id. at 1481. However, the Court also reaffirmed that deportation “is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.” Id. In light of that statement, we cannot agree that Padilla provides sufficient guidance to deviate from the long line cases establishing that statutes retroactively setting criteria for deportation do not violate the ex post facto clause.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is Denied.

FOOTNOTES

1. Alvarado-Fonseca offered no explanation for his position that armed robbery should not be considered a conviction for “using, owning, possessing, or carrying, ․ any weapon ․ in violation of any law” under INS § 237(a)(2)(C), and we can think of none. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). However, contrary to the government's request, we cannot deny the petition on the ground that Alvarado-Fonseca is removable pursuant to INS § 237(a)(2)(C). While the BIA noted that the IJ found Alvarado-Fonseca to be removable under § 237(a)(2)(C), it did not rely on § 237(a)(2)(C) as a basis for its ruling. Nor did the BIA adopt the IJ's opinion. Therefore, the BIA's decision is “the exclusive focus of our review.” Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir.2007). Under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), we cannot uphold the BIA's ruling on “a ground that is not articulated-or at least discernable-in the decision itself.” Atunnise v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 830, 838 (7th Cir.2008). Because the BIA did not rely on § 237(a)(2)(C) in dismissing Alvarado-Fonseca's appeal, we cannot deny the petition on that basis.

2. We have not addressed that issue. Both the BIA and a number of our sister circuits have considered it, and have reached varying conclusions based on the interplay of the ADAA, the IMMAct, and the IIRIRA. See Lewis v. INS, 194 F.3d 539, 543 n. 5 (4th Cir.1999) (deferring to BIA's interpretation that the second sentence of IMMAct § 602(c) overrides ADAA § 7344(b)); Lettman v. Reno, 207 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir.2000) (same); Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86 (2d Cir.2000) (rejecting BIA's interpretation that IMMAct § 602(c) overrides ADAA § 7344(b), but nevertheless concluding that petitioner convicted before 1988 is deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony after entry into the United States, because IMMAct § 602(d) overrides ADAA § 7344(b)); Ledezma-Galicia, 599 F.3d 1055 (concluding that neither IMMAct § 602 nor IIRIRA § 321(b) overrides ADAA § 7344(b)).

3. Alvarado-Fonseca did not file a reply brief to refute the government's exhaustion argument and argue that he properly preserved this issue.

4. As noted above, the BIA has concluded in other cases that IMMAct § 602(c) overrides ADAA § 7344(b). Presumably, the BIA would have dismissed Alvarado-Fonseca's appeal on that ground if he had presented the argument he now raises in his administrative appeal. Therefore, one might argue that Alvarado-Fonseca should be excused from administrative exhaustion on futility grounds. (Alvarado-Fonseca does not attempt to avoid the exhaustion requirement by advancing this argument, or any other for that matter). However, we rejected a similar argument in United States v. Roque-Espinoza, 338 F.3d 724, 729 (7th Cir.2003), noting that “the law would never change if litigants did not request the responsible tribunals to reconsider earlier rulings.”

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