Monday, February 7, 2011

USCIS Issues Interim Guidance on Providing Information on Appeals and Motions to Reopen or Reconsider in Denial Notices; Seeks Comments

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has released to the public an interim policy memorandum (IPM) dated January 26, 2011, providing USCIS adjudicators issuing denial notices guidance on advising petitioners and applicants as to whether they may file a motion to reopen or reconsider or an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) or the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO).  The IPM, including the revised AFM chapters.
.

The IPM, entitled “Notice to Applicants and Petitioners Concerning Ability to File Motions to Reopen or Reconsider; Revisions to the Adjudicator's Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 10.7; AFM Update AD11-09,” points out that 8 CFR § 103.3(a)(1)(iii) requires that USCIS include in a written denial of a petition or application information about whether the petitioner or applicant can appeal the decision. In addition, the IPM notes that, when available, petitioners and applicants may also file motions under 8 CFR § 103.5 to reopen or reconsider an adverse decision and advises that, although not required by law or regulation, USCIS has determined that written decisions should also include information about the opportunity to file these motions.

The IPM directs that any written decision denying a petition or application must advise the petitioner or applicant as to whether he or she may appeal the decision to the BIA or the AAO and must include the proper appeal form if the decision is appealable. Adjudicators are also advised that, if available, written denials must also advise the petitioner or applicant that he or she may file a motion to reopen, a motion to reconsider, or both within the period specified in 8 CFR § 103.5(a). Such notices are to include Form I-290B. Despite the IPM's title, the AFM is revised throughout to reflect this guidance, not just in Chapter 10.7. The IPM, including the revised AFM chapters, is reproduced here.

The memorandum, which was posted on January 31, 2011, will be available on the website for 10 business days after posting. It is effective until further notice. USCIS states that adjudicators will use the current memorandum with the understanding that the guidance may be revised after the comment period closes. Final guidance will be issued to the field offices and service centers following review and consideration of the comments from the public.

Comments must be submitted by February 14, 2011, and should be emailed to opefeedback@uscis.dhs.gov. The title of the memorandum should be in the subject line of the email. Comments should refer to a specific portion of the memorandum, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include data, information, or authority that support the recommendation. USCIS may distribute any comments received (including any personal information and contact information) on its public website or to those who request copies.

Labels: ,

Thursday, June 3, 2010

Matter of MONGES-Garcia, 25 I&N Dec. 246 (BIA 2010)

BIA Finds No Conflict Between Regulation's Time Limits on Motions to Reopen and INA § 242B(e)(1)'s Limit on Discretionary Relief.

(1) The 90-day time limitation for filing a motion to reopen in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2010) applies to motions to reopen in absentia deportation orders for the purpose of adjusting status, whether filed before or after the 1996 promulgation of the regulations.

(2) The 5-year limitation on discretionary relief for failure to appear at deportation proceedings under former section 242B(e)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(e)(1) (1994), is not in conflict with, and does not provide an exception to, the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) held in Matter of Monges-Garcia, 25 I. & N. Dec. 246 (B.I.A. May 20, 2010), that (1) the 90-day time limitation for filing a motion to reopen in 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(1) (2010) applies to motions to reopen in absentia deportation orders for the purpose of adjusting status, whether filed before or after the 1996 promulgation of the regulation, and (2) the five-year limitation on discretionary relief for failure to appear at deportation proceedings under former INA § 242B(e)(1) (1994) is not in conflict with, and does not provide an exception to, that 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen. The matter was before the BIA following the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's remand of the Board's prior decision in the matter to permit the Board to answer these questions, Monges-Garcia v. Gonzales, 228 Fed. Appx. 665 (9th Cir. 2007).

The respondent is a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the U.S. without inspection on February 16, 1994, after which deportation proceedings were initiated against her with the issuance of an order to show cause and notice of hearing (Form I-221). When the respondent failed to appear for her scheduled hearing on October 28, 1994, the immigration judge (IJ) ordered her deported in absentia. On April 7, 2003, the respondent filed a motion to reopen her deportation proceedings, seeking to apply for adjustment of status based on her marriage to a U.S. citizen. The IJ denied the motion, finding that the respondent did not establish that her failure to appear resulted from a lack of notice or exceptional circumstances as required by former INA § 242B(e)(1) and that her motion was time barred under the regulations. The Board upheld this decision, and the respondent sought review in the Ninth Circuit, which remanded.

Former INA § 242B(e)(1), which was added by § 545(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT), [FN3]  provides as follows: At deportation proceedings.--Any alien against whom a final order of deportation is entered in absentia under this section and who, at the time of the notice described in subsection (a)(2), was provided oral notice, either in the alien's native language or in another language the alien understands, of the time and place of the proceedings and of the consequences under this paragraph of failing, other than because of exceptional circumstances (as defined in subsection (f)(2)) to attend a proceeding under section 242, shall not be eligible for relief described in paragraph (5) for a period of 5 years after the date of the entry of the final order of deportation.

Listed in paragraph (5) are voluntary departure under INA § 242(b)(1) [8 USCA § 1252(b)(1)], suspension of deportation or voluntary departure under INA § 244 [8 USCA § 1254], and adjustment or change of status under INA §§ 245, 248, or 249 [8 USCA §§ 1255, 1258, or 1259]. In conjunction with this and other provisions in § 242B relating to the required notice of deportation hearings that must be given to aliens and the consequences for their failure to appear, Congress mandated that the Attorney General issue implementing regulations within six months of enactment of IMMACT regarding the period of time in which motions to reopen and to reconsider may be offered in deportation proceedings, including a limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a maximum time period for the filing of such motions. Accordingly, the Department of Justice published a final rule in 61 Fed. Reg. 18900 (Apr. 29, 1996), effective July 1, 1996. The regulation, now at 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(1), provides that, subject to certain exceptions, a party may file only one motion to reconsider and one motion to reopen proceedings, which must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.

The BIA, in an opinion written by Board Member Charles K. Adkins-Blanch and joined by Board Member John H. Guendelsberger and Temporary Board Member Jean C. King, found that, pursuant to the time limitations imposed by the regulations, a motion to reopen a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion entered on or after the July 1, 1996, effective date is subject to the 90-day deadline because 90 days after the date of the order would be later than September 30, 1996. In addition, the Board said, the regulations make clear that any motion to reopen such a final order entered before July 1, 1996, must necessarily be filed by September 30, 1996, which is the later deadline in that case. Since these regulations were promulgated pursuant to Congress' directive in conjunction with its enactment of the enforcement provisions of INA § 242B setting forth the consequences of failure to appear at deportation proceedings, the Board concluded that (1) Congress clearly intended that the time and number limitations on motions would further the statute's purpose of bringing finality to immigration proceedings and (2) therefore, the 90-day time limitation for filing a motion to reopen contained in 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(1) applies to motions to reopen in absentia deportation orders for the purpose of adjusting status, whether filed before or *1052  after the 1996 promulgation of the regulations. Thus, since the respondent is subject to the current version of 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(1), which required her to file her motion to reopen by September 30, 1996, because her in absentia deportation order was issued on October 28, 1994, and her motion to reopen was not submitted until April 7, 2003, the Board found her motion untimely filed and therefore properly denied by the IJ.

Turning to the Ninth Circuit's second question, the Board found no conflict between the regulation and INA § 242B(e)(1), both of which emanated from Congress' concern over delays in immigration proceedings. Since the regulations carry out Congress' intent, the Board saw no inconsistency between them and the statute. The Board rejected the respondent's contention that INA § 242B(e)(1)' s five-year limitation on an alien's eligibility for discretionary relief as a result of failure to appear at deportation proceedings is an exception to the 90-day deadline in 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(1). The Board explained that the five-year bar is applicable only to aliens who failed to appear for a hearing, including those who left the U.S. and subsequently returned, whereas the general time limitation on filing a motion contained in 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(1) is an independent provision that applies to any alien who has been ordered excluded, deported, or removed. These provisions, the Board said, have separate restrictions for different purposes and are not at odds with one another. Moreover, since Congress intended to prevent aliens from obtaining benefits as a result of the mere accrual of time after the entry of a final administrative order, the Board opined that it would be inconsistent with that intent to allow an alien who avoided deportation for more than five years after failing to appear for a hearing to be exempt from the regulatory time limitations on motions to reopen. Thus the Board concluded that aliens must comply with the applicable provisions of both 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(1) and INA § 242B(e)(1) in order to apply for adjustment of status.

Since the respondent's motion to reopen was filed well after the regulatory deadlines and did not qualify for any of the permissible exceptions to the time limits on motions to reopen, the Board upheld the IJ's decision that the respondent was precluded from reopening her proceedings. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Labels: , , ,

Wednesday, July 30, 2008

7th Circuit interprets "questions of law" for reopening cases, post-Kucana

Seventh Circuit Overrules Singh , Holds that 8 USCA § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) Bars Review of Decisions Regarding Motions to Reopen

Kucana v. Mukasey, No. 07–1002, 2008 WL 2639039 (7th Cir. July 7, 2008)

In Singh v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit held that the denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of an alien's motion to reopen removal proceedings did not fall within the jurisdiction-stripping provision for discretionary decisions of the Attorney General, INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) [8 USCA § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)], because “conspicuously absent” from the statute providing for motions to reopen, INA § 240(c)(6) [8 USCA § 1229a(c)(6)], is any specific language entrusting the decision to the discretion of the Attorney General. Subsequently, in Ali v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit held that under 8 USCA § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), it lacked jurisdiction to review a BIA decision affirming the denial of an alien's request for a continuance of his removal proceedings because such a motion is a discretionary decision the authority for which is committed to the immigration judge (IJ) not only expressly by regulation (8 CFR § 1003.29), but implicitly as part of the IJ's plenary authority under 8 USCA § 1229a to control the course of removal proceedings. [FN1]

In Kucana v. Mukasey, 2008 WL 2639039 (7th Cir. July 7, 2008), a panel of the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, held that 8 USCA § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) deprives the court of jurisdiction to review a BIA decision denying the alien's motion to reopen, and that Singh must be overruled to the extent it holds otherwise.

As background, 8 USCA § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) provides in part as follows:

except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h) [regarding waiver of certain grounds of inadmissibility], 1182(i) [regarding waiver of inadmissibility based on fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact], 1229b [regarding cancellation of removal], 1229c [regarding voluntary departure], or 1255 [regarding adjustment of status of nonimmigrant to that of person admitted for permanent residence] of this title.

8 USCA § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides in part as follows: except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter [Subchapter II, Immigration] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title [regarding applications for asylum].

8 USCA § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides as follows: Nothing in subparagraph (B) ... which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.

8 USCA § 1252(b)(6) provides: When a petitioner seeks review of an order under this section, any review sought of a motion to reopen or reconsider the order shall be consolidated with the review of the order.

Chief Judge Easterbrook said:

Recently this circuit addressed the question--on which other courts of appeals are divided--whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies when the agency's discretion is specified by a regulation rather than a statute. After the parties filed their briefs in this case, we held in Ali ... that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to discretionary decisions under regulations that are based on and implement the Immigration and Nationality Act. The discretionary decision in Ali was whether to grant an alien's request for a continuance of a hearing; here the discretionary decision is whether to reopen the proceeding and hold a new hearing. Regulations specify that both decisions are discretionary; both regulations draw their force from provisions in the Act allowing immigration officials to govern their own proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (authority for reopening by Board). It follows that they are equally subject to § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

The panel's view in Singh was that consolidation of proceedings concerning direct and reopening decisions would be pointless, if orders denying reopening never were subject to judicial review. That was true when the panel issued its opinion (April 15, 2005) but is true no longer. On May 11, 2005, the Real ID Act, Pub.L. 109-13 Div. B Tit. I, took effect. Today decisions denying reopening are within our jurisdiction to the extent provided by § 1252(a)(2)(D)... Because discretionary decisions now may be reviewed when they entail “constitutional claims or questions of law”, there's nothing incongruous about the consolidation rule in § 1252(b)(6). Applying § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to orders denying motions to reopen will not make any part of the statute unnecessary.

The Real ID Act not only changed the relation among statutory subsections but also alleviated the principal consideration that had led the judiciary to confine clauses such as § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to the least scope they had to have. Judges were concerned that an elimination of all review would permit the agency to violate statutes and the Constitution at will. The enactment of § 1252(a)(2)(D) eliminates that reason for giving § 1252(a)(2)(B) a narrow reading--and, as the other arguments advanced in Singh also have been overtaken by events, we conclude that Singh must be overruled to the extent it holds § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) inapplicable to discretionary reopening decisions.

Chief Judge Easterbrook's opinion was circulated under Circuit Rule 40(e) to all 15 active judges. A majority of them did not favor a hearing en banc. However, five judges (Joel M. Flaum, Kenneth F. Ripple, Ilana Diamond Rovner, Diane P. Wood, and Ann Claire Williams) voted in favor of a hearing en banc.

Judge Ripple, concurring, dubitante: [FN2]

Judge Ripple agreed with the principal opinion that the disposition of the present case appears to be controlled by the court's holding in Ali, which he said “operates as a de facto overruling of our decision in Singh...” He added:

Although I believe that we are bound by the holding in Ali and that the principal opinion represents a logical extension of that holding, I write separately because I continue to be concerned by the breadth of Ali's holding. In Ali, we addressed our authority to hear appeals from the denial of a motion to continue--an interim decision, discretionary in nature, which “derives from 8 U.S.C. § 1229a,” which, in turn, “confers upon immigration judges the plenary authority to conduct removal proceedings.” ... We further observed that “[t]he regulation regarding continuances simply implements the immigration judge's statutory authority to control the course of removal proceedings.” .... Here, however, the rationale of Ali is being applied beyond the realm of procedural rulings; it is being used to deny aliens review of substantive decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals that are based on a mistake or misunderstanding of the factual basis of the claim--decisions that the Supreme Court has analogized to motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) [regarding grounds for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding]. ... Furthermore, although the present case involves only a motion to reopen, Ali's rationale would appear to apply equally to motions to reconsider--the basis for which must be a mistake or misapprehension of law. ... In short, the rationale of Ali, taken to its logical conclusion, deprives this court of jurisdiction to review the BIA's mistakes of fact and law made during the course of deciding whether an alien should be removed from this country.

Although the result today appears to be dictated by circuit precedent, I respectfully suggest that, had Congress intended to deprive this court of jurisdiction of specific substantive decisions, it would have done so explicitly, as it did in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). As Ali spreads its dominion to substantive fields, it is turning this court into a virtual council of revision with respect to settled federal law. Before taking these steps, we should revisit the holding in Ali and determine whether we should chart a course that more closely adheres to the statutory language chosen and enacted by Congress.

Judge Richard D. Cudahy, dissenting:

In Ali ... we adopted a view, which (as that opinion acknowledged) is in a minority one among the circuits, with respect to our jurisdiction over appeals from denials of continuances. Six of our sister courts had concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not preclude federal appellate courts from reviewing orders denying such motions. Only the Eighth and Tenth Circuits had held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes federal courts of appeals from reviewing an immigration judge's denial of a continuance. ... Yet even these courts continue to exercise jurisdiction over motions to reopen. ... The principal opinion would cause us to become a minority within the minority, giving the executive branch the authority to insulate its decisions from judicial review where there is no clear indication in the statute that Congress intended to strip us of our jurisdiction. Our isolated posture in this respect may give us pause here.

Ultimately, the principal opinion rests its rejection of Singh upon the focus of the Real ID Act upon judicial reviewability of “constitutional claims or questions of law.” According to the principal opinion this eliminates the need for a narrow reading of jurisdiction-stripping provisions and meets the judiciary's principal concern in this area. I think this exercise in judicial psychoanalysis must yield to broader principles favoring judicial review of administrative decisions.

As the concurrence points out, the rationale of the principal opinion would bar our review of motions to reconsider, which are based on errors of law and fact. Absent “ ‘specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent,’ or a specific congressional intent to preclude judicial review that is ‘fairly discernible in the detail of the legislative scheme,’ ” Traynor, 485 U.S. at 542, 108 S.Ct. 1372, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 673, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986)), I am reluctant to broaden the immunity from review of an administrative process not necessarily renowned for its reliability.

Judge Ripple, with whom Judges Rovner, Wood, and Williams join, dissenting from the denial of a rehearing en banc:

This case presents an important issue with respect to the scope of this court's holding in Ali ... In Ali, we addressed our authority to hear appeals from the denial of a motion to continue--an interim decision that is discretionary in nature. ... Here, however, the rationale of Ali is being applied beyond the realm of such a procedural ruling; it is being used to deny aliens review of a motion to reopen, a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals that is based on a mistake or misunderstanding of the factual basis of the claim. This expansion into the realm of outcome determinative decisions takes us a long way from the statutory language chosen and enacted by Congress. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).

Applying Ali to deny aliens review of the decision whether to reopen crystalizes the importance of revisiting the breadth of that holding: The Supreme Court has analogized motions to reopen to motions under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) .... Indeed, since the panel's consideration of this case, the Supreme Court has characterized motions to reopen as an “important safeguard” designed to “ensure a proper and lawful disposition.” Dada v. Mukasey, No. 06-1181, --- S.Ct. ----, 2008 WL 2404066 at *15, 16 (June 16, 2008). [FN3] This new holding of the Supreme Court should make us pause, take a deep breath and consider anew whether we really want to take the Circuit down a path so contrary to the manifest intent of Congress and to the Supreme Court's understanding of that intent. If we take such a course, our decision will no doubt warrant close scrutiny by the Supreme Court.

Michael R. Lang, Chicago, Illinois, for the petitioner. Kathryn Deangelis, Department of Justice Civil Division, Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for the respondent.

[FN1]. Ali is discussed in 84 Interpreter Releases 2265 (Oct. 1, 2007).

[FN2]. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) defines “dubitante” as indicating that the judge doubts a legal point but is unwilling to state that it is wrong.

[FN3]. Dada is discussed in 85 Interpreter Releases 1789 (June 23, 2008) and 85 Interpreter Releases 1878 (July 7, 2008).

Labels: , ,